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GROUP THINK: THE LAW OF
CONSPIRACY AND COLLECTIVE REASON
JENS DAVID OHLIN*
Although vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators is firmly
entrenched in federal courts, no adequate theory explains how the act and
intention of one conspiratorcan be attributedto another, simply by virtue
of their criminal agreement. This Article argues that the most promising
avenue for solving the Pinkerton paradox is an appeal to the collective
intention of the conspiratorialgroup to commit the crime. Unfortunately,
misplaced skepticism about the notion of a "group will" has prevented
criminal scholars from embracing the notion of a conspiracy's collective
intention to commit a crime. However, positing group intentions requires
only that the criminal law recognize the rational relationships between
individuals who decide to collectivize reason to pursue a common criminal
goal; no burdensome theory of corporate animals with unified minds is
required. After exploring the different rationalstructures that a conspiracy
can have, the Article outlines the circumstances when vicarious liability
could be justified. Specifically, liability must be limited to participantsin
tightly knit conspiracies who engage in the kind of common deliberation
that is capable of yielding collective intentions. A further consequence of
this theory is that liability must be restricted to acts that fall within the
scope of the criminalplan, not just acts that should have been reasonably
foreseeable to members of the conspiracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pinkerton liability has long confounded criminal law scholars. Under
this venerable doctrine, first announced by the Supreme Court in 1946, a
conspirator's actions may be attributed to all members of the conspiracy,
subjecting them to criminal liability for the substantive crimes of their coconspirators.' The classic example is the bank robber who shoots (or
* Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School; Ph.D., Columbia University; J.D., Columbia
Law School.
1 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (allowing liability for the
reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by co-conspirators).
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threatens to shoot) a security guard. The lookout who stays behind in the
car is just as guilty as the shooter, as long as it was reasonably foreseeable
that the plan might go awry and result in physical violence.2 Federal courts
have continued to reaffirm and apply Pinkerton at every turn in the
intervening decades. Earlier this year, for example, the Seventh Circuit
upheld a defendant's conviction for using a firearm in a crime of violence
when it was unclear whether the defendant had a gun. 3 Writing for a
unanimous panel that included Judges Easterbrook and Wood, Judge Posner
wrote that the factual issue of the defendant's gun possession was
irrelevant. 4 A co-conspirator in the bank robbery had brandished a gun, so
Pinkerton allowed the government to charge the defendant with using a
firearm in a crime of violence, despite the fact that he had done no such
thing.5 Such outcomes are commonplace in the federal courts, though both
the Model Penal Code and many state jurisdictions have either eliminated
or pulled back from Pinkerton.
Indeed, the law of conspiracy in general is under pressure.6 The
Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld7 demonstrated remarkable

2 See, e.g., United States v. Rawlings, 341 F.3d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing
applicability of Pinkerton in bank robbery cases).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that
it was
irrelevant whether a defendant, convicted of using a firearm during a bank robbery, was
personally holding a gun, because Pinkerton liability justified the charge because his
accomplice had a gun).
4 Id. at 433 (permitting conviction for "brandishing" gun even though defendant may not
have been the one with the gun).
5 See United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2006) (referring to this
application of Pinkerton as "constructive possession of the weapon").
6 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("The unavailing protest of courts against the growing habit to indict for conspiracy in lieu
of prosecuting for the substantive offense itself, or in addition thereto, suggests that loose
practice as to this offense constitutes a serious threat to fairness in our administration of
justice."). Note that Learned Hand himself upheld the doctrine. See Harrison v. United
States, 7 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1925). In Harrison,Judge Hand made the comment about the
prosecutor's nursery in holding that cumulative sentences were rarely appropriate "where the
counts are for merely alternative forms of the same offense, and where a conspiracy count is
added to a count for the substantive crime." Id. at 263. Hand concluded:
It appears to us that the maximum sentence prescribed by Congress is intended to cover the
whole substantive offense in its extremest degree, no matter in how many different ways a
draughtsman may plead it, and even though he add a count for conspiracy, that darling of the
modem prosecutor's nursery.
Id. It is striking, though, that despite the sarcasm of the quote, the conspiracy doctrine
remains unscathed by the court's holding in the case.
7 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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skepticism about conspiracy as an inchoate substantive crimeS8-at least in
the international context-and took judicial notice of the fact that many
nations have no notion of it at all in their criminal law. 9 The international
version of Pinkerton-Joint Criminal Enterprise liability or JCE-is
notoriously expansive in its reach,' 0 and the doctrine's acronym is snidely
8 This element of the conspiracy doctrine, most closely associated with U.S. penal law (it

remains unused in many European civil law jurisdictions), could be called conspiracy as a
substantive offense. Here, the act of "agreeing" is itself the crime. Federal law provides
criminal liability for a conspiratorial agreement, even before the plan comes to fruition. See
18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2007) (providing five-year maximum for the stand-alone offense of
conspiracy). At least one member of the conspiracy must make an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy, although the defendant need not in order to be prosecuted. These
prosecutions can be either ex post or ex ante. Conspiracy as a stand-alone offense is
relatively unknown in civil law jurisdictions, where punishments are usually less severe than
in the United States. These two factors are not unrelated. See James Q. Whitman, The
ComparativeStudy of CriminalPunishment, 1 ANN. REv. L & Soc. Sci. 17, 32 (2005). U.S.
jurisdictions are uniquely committed to intervening early in criminal endeavors with harsh
punishments in order to deter future criminal conduct. When performed ex post, the benefit
for prosecutors is that they need not offer any proof about the criminal act itself. They might
simply offer evidence of the original conspiratorial agreement and leave it at that, even if
they know that the plan did, indeed, come to fruition. When prosecuted ex ante, before the
plan has a chance to come to fruition, conspiracy provides an institutional avenue by which
the criminal justice system can intervene early in the development of a criminal endeavor
and stop it before it actually happens. See, e.g., lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778
(1975) (noting that "the agreement is the essential evil at which the crime of conspiracy is
directed"); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975) (noting that "although the law
generally makes criminal only antisocial conduct, at some point in the continuum between
preparation and consummation, the likelihood of a commission of an act is sufficiently great
and the criminal intent sufficiently well formed to justify the intervention of the criminal
law"); United States v. Beil, 577 F.2d 1313, 1315 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The law of
conspiracy identifies the agreement to engage in a criminal venture as an event of sufficient
threat to social order to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions for the agreement alone,
plus an overt act in pursuit of it, regardless of whether the crime agreed upon actually is
committed.").
9 When Congress passed the Military Commissions Act in response to the Hamdan
ruling, it specifically authorized military commissions to try individuals charged with the
inchoate crime of conspiracy. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600 (2006). Congress eliminated, however, all mention of conspiracy as a mode
of vicarious liability for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators and replaced it with the
more traditional notion of aiding and abetting. Id.
10The doctrine was formulated in a crucial opinion by Judge Cassese in Prosecutorv.
Tadik, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY Appeals Judgment, paras. 226-29 (July 15, 1999), and
allows defendants to be convicted for the criminal actions of their confederates in a joint
criminal enterprise as long as the actions were reasonably foreseeable (thus mirroring
Pinkerton). Despite constant criticism, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has reaffirmed the
doctrine on numerous occasions, most notably in Prosecutorv. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A,
ICTY Appeals Judgment (Mar. 22, 2002). For a discussion of the theoretical implications of
joint criminal enterprise liability, see Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command
Responsibility, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 159 (2007); Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual
Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 69 (2007).
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referred to at the tribunals as "Just Convict Everybody."'"
These
developments suggest a renewed level of scrutiny for this still unsettled area
of the criminal law.
In the past, the scholarly literature has either focused its attention on
developing a theory to ground vicarious conspiratorial liability or has
simply advocated for Pinkerton's demise. 12 Other scholars have made the
more radical suggestion that the wider concept of conspiracy itself should
be wiped from the landscape of criminal law. 13 This Article will argue that
each of these avenues is flawed. Conspiracy is indispensable as a general
category to capture the essence of group criminality, but no scholar has
successfully developed a theory consistent with the basic principles of
criminal law sufficient to ground vicarious liability for co-conspirators.
This Article aims to provide that doctrinal justification.
To that end, Part II will first examine the previous attempts at
justifying vicarious liability. In order to bring the practice in compliance
with basic notions of criminal law, these attempts have found ways to
impute both an "act" and "intention" to the defendant sufficient to hold him
liable for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators. Various moves are
possible here, though the most promising one involved finding the relevant
intention in the group's intention to commit the crime. If the group truly
"intended" the result, it was hardly a stretch to attribute this will to each
member of the group. However, this view has long since been abandoned
because it seemed to require positing a "group will" that implied the
existence of a supra-human mind filled with the same kind of mental
See also Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law,
93 CAL.L. REv. 75, 137 (2005) ("[I]t is difficult to see how JCE can amount to anything less
than the nuclear bomb of the international prosecutor's arsenal.").
1 See G6ran Sluiter, Guilt by Association:Joint Criminal Enterpriseon Trial, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 67, 67 (2007).
12 See Phillip Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1137
(1973). The criticisms have a long pedigree. See, e.g., Francis B. Sayre, Criminal
Conspiracy,35 HARv. L. REv. 393, 393 (1922) (concluding that "[a] doctrine so vague in its
outlines and uncertain in its fundamental nature as criminal conspiracy lends no strength or
glory to the law; it is a veritable quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought").
13 The doctrine is of course under great debate in the scholarly literature. See, e.g.,
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS IN CRIMINAL LAW 192 (1998) (noting that "it is
impossible under American law to hold individuals liable simply for what they do, each
according to his or her own degree of criminal participation"). Nonetheless, no case in the
federal courts has substantially rolled back the Pinkerton doctrine since its creation-a
resounding tribute to the power of stare decisis. United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640
(1946); see also Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A "New" Due Process Limit on
Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 92 (2006) (referring to Pinkerton as
"one of the most venerable, well-settled, and unexamined precedents in American criminal
law" and discussing due process limitations on its application).
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experiences that human beings have. This notion smacked of exaggeration
at best, incoherence at worst. Scholars sought alternate
routes to attribute
14
the required actus reus and mens rea to the defendant.
Indeed, Part III will consider how the "group will" view became
untenable, in particular because legal realism discouraged analysis into the
metaphysics of collective endeavors generally. Although this debate
happened within the context of corporations, its effects were far-reaching,
and the notion that conspiracies have a "group mind" was similarly
discredited. Part IV will argue that this was especially unfortunate since
groups truly matter to the law and cannot be reduced to their individual
members. One consequence of this view is that the call to eliminate the law
of conspiracy is an overreaction to the problem.
Part V will show that the discredited view of conspiracies with a
''group will," sufficient to meet the mental element required for vicarious
liability, stemmed from an overemphasis on archaic psychological notions,
and that the group mindedness of a conspiracy involves nothing more
theoretically shocking than the rational relations between its members. The
elements of this argument come from sober rational choice theory, not farflung psychology. With this shift in orientation, it becomes quite possible
to view the conspiracy as a series of "overlapping" agents, each of whom
commits a portion of their lives to a collective endeavor and, for this limited
purpose, agrees to submit to a common process of deliberation and
execution. This model of the conspiracy as a series of overlapping agents
provides the best ground for attributing the mental intention of the group to
its individual members, as well as the acts of one conspirator to all others,
and it does so without resort to the panicky psychology of a group will.
This model recognizes the irreducibly collective aspect to some criminal
behavior, yet also explains how these collective endeavors are built from
the bricks and mortar of individual agents.
Part VI will employ this model to describe the different categories of
conspiracies, each with a slightly different structure, while Part VII will
trace the doctrinal implications. Specifically, attribution of the group's
intention to each individual provides the justification for vicarious
conspiratorial liability, though only for acts within the scope of the criminal
agreement and only for tightly knit conspiracies. As for Pinkerton liability,
no basis exists for attribution of acts that fall outside the scope of the
criminal agreement, for the simple reason that these acts play no part in
group deliberations. Consequently, neither actus reus nor mens rea can be
attributed to the other members of the conspiracy in these situations.
14

See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 617 (1984)

(discussing imputation of act and culpability to defendants in Pinkerton cases).
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II. THE DOCTRINAL MYSTERIES OF PINKERTON

In a way, Pinkerton is really two rules rolled into one. The first
element of the rule allows for vicarious liability for the crimes of coconspirators that fall within the scope of the criminal plan. The second,
more extensive application of the rule applies in cases where the actions of
a co-conspirator fall outside the scope of the criminal agreement, but are
nonetheless attributed to the defendant because they were "reasonably
foreseeable." Pinkerton's name is usually affixed to the latter, more
controversial application, in part because it was in Pinkerton that -the
Supreme Court announced the language of "reasonable foreseeability," a
language initially more familiar in tort than criminal law, but now firmly
entrenched in the latter discipline as well. 15 However, it is important to note
that Pinkerton itself actually involved application of the more pedestrian
vicarious liability. The case involved two brothers convicted of tax
evasion, where one alone committed the criminal acts, though both were
charged by virtue of an alleged criminal agreement between them to evade
taxation. Application of the doctrine to actions outside the 16scope of the
criminal agreement was developed in the subsequent case law.
A. THE ACT AND INTENTION REQUIREMENTS
The central dilemma is whether the defendant has committed an act,
with the required intent, in order to be convicted of the substantive offense
for which he is charged. So the question in Pinkerton was simply how
Daniel Pinkerton could be convicted for Walter's actions, especially since
Daniel was in jail when Walter committed them. Somehow, by virtue of
the criminal agreement, 17 the act and intentions of one become the acts and
intentions of the other, and liability can be attributed to all who join the
15

Compare People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392, 398 (Cal. 1985) (allowing liability under

aiding and abetting and conspiracy for acts that are reasonably foreseeable), with People v.
Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing theoretical infirmities
to reasonably foreseeable doctrine but upholding it on policy grounds).
16 See, e.g., State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270 (N.J. 1993).

17Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more individuals to pursue an
unlawful goal. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2007). See generally GEORGE P.

FLETCHER,

RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 646 (Oxford reprint ed. 2000) (1978); Jens David Ohlin,
Conspiracy,in OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Antonio Cassese

ed., forthcoming 2008). Our commonsense understanding of conspiracies is helpful here:
they are secretive enterprises, pursued in proverbial backrooms, where the efficiencies of
collective action and secrecy are harnessed to fulfill a criminal endeavor. See United States
v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) ("It involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws,
educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it
is characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its
discovery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered.").
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conspiracy. Furthermore, each individual bears equal responsibility for the
actions of the conspiracy.' 8 Why does joining the conspiracy turn the acts
of others into one's own, as far as the law is concerned? This aspect of
Pinkerton continues to elude coherent explanation.' 9 This basic question
must be analyzed first before considering its more controversial
applications.
Of course, the answer is that the Pinkerton brothers conspired
together.20 But why should this matter? One possibility is that Daniel's
required mental state for tax evasion can be found in his intent that his
brother Walter commit the crime, assuming of course that the act fell within
the scope of the criminal plan and was explicitly discussed. While this
view sounds plausible, it does not explain where we find the act
requirement, since Daniel committed no act of tax evasion at all. In order to
justify individual liability, consistent with the principle of culpability,
Daniel must have committed a wrongful act.2 l

Culpability here means

culpability for wrongdoing-and wrongdoing presupposes an act in
violation of the law. Culpability cannot be separated from action because it
stems from wrongful acts.22 In order to fulfill the culpability requirement
for a Pinkerton prosecution, then, we must somehow show that the
defendant committed a wrongful act, even though the act he is prosecuted
for is the act of his co-conspirator.
One possibility is simply to attribute Walter's act to Daniel, on the
theory that Walter's acts become Daniel's merely because the two of them
formed a criminal agreement. This explanation hardly makes sense, at least
not without some larger account to explain how one person's act can
become another person's act by some alchemic transformation. After all, it
was Walter who performed the act, not Daniel.
The more likely avenue to provide the act requirement, then, is to
argue that Daniel's "act" was joining the conspiracy, or forming the
18See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2(a) (West 2007) ("Whoever commits an offense against the United

States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
as a principal."); see also United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1985)

(discussing historical evolution of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)).
19 But see FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 649-64; CLAUS RoxiN, TATERSCHAFT UND
TATHERRSCHAFT (2006) (analyzing concepts of participation, perpetration, complicity, and
conspiracy).
20 The criminal plans need not necessarily be grand, although they are almost always
sufficiently complex that no one criminal could accomplish the task himself Other modes
of liability, such as co-perpetration, require cooperation in order to achieve criminal goals.
See FLETCHER, supranote 17, at 659.
21 For a discussion of culpability requirements, see infra notes 40-42 and accompanying
text.
22 See FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 459.
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conspiratorial agreement, which ought to be sufficient to meet the act
requirement in order to hold Daniel liable for Walter's substantive offense.
While it is undeniable that Daniel did commit this act, the act of joining the
conspiracy is not the same act as the act of committing tax evasion. If
anything, this act simply makes Daniel guilty of the inchoate offense of
conspiracy to commit tax evasion, but not guilty of tax evasion proper.
Surely the two are distinct.
Consider also the more problematic case where the act in question falls
outside the scope of the original agreement. Assume that both brothers
conspire to commit tax evasion, but Walter commits additional financial
frauds that were neither discussed, nor agreed to, by Daniel. Under
Pinkerton, liability might be assessed if the additional financial frauds are
considered a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the tax evasion
scheme. However, in such a case, Daniel never had any intention of
committing the additional financial fraud, so the logical move is to find the
required mental element in Daniel's intent to join the criminal conspiracy in
the first instance. The well-traveled problem is that this mental element
suggests at most a crime of negligence, insofar as Daniel intended one
result but, out of negligence, got another. It hardly supports imposition of
full liability on Daniel for Walter's substantive offense. The final option is
simply to attribute Walter's intention to Daniel. But what could justify such
a transfer? As one judge put it:
The major fallacy I see in the "foreseeable consequence" doctrine is not so much that
it attributes an unintended act to the accomplice/co-conspirator but rather that it
assesses the degree of his culpability for that act not by his own mental state23but rather
crime.
by the mental state of the perpetrator and/or the circumstances of the

The best explanation for how the perpetrator's act and intention travel
to the defendant is the path least traveled. For acts that fall within the scope
of the criminal agreement, it is the group itself-the conspiracy-that
carries the required mental element for the offense, and this fact alone
justifies attribution of the required intention to the group's individual
members. If the group "intends" the result, all parts of the group can be
legitimately said to "intend" the result as well. Furthermore, the same
argument can be made for the act requirement as well. But how does one
impute the act to the defendant in a Pinkerton case? What wrongful act did
he commit? Somehow, the wrongful act of the perpetrator who commits
the crime must be attributed to the defendant, and this Article will provide a

23 See People v. Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (Wiener, J.,
concurring).
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rationale for this attribution 24 by appealing to sober principles of rational
choice theory that should suit all criminal law scholars. Simply put, if one
member of the group commits an action that is caused by the group's
intention to commit the crime, it is plausible to attribute the act to the group
itself, and by reverse extension, back down to each of its members.
B. FROM COLLECTIVE TO INDIVIDUAL CULPABILITY
Charting this reverse path is, however, very controversial.
The
inference from collective intentions to individual criminal liability is not
necessarily self-evident. To skeptics of this inference, the group is one
thing, its constituent members another. For example, if the nation is guilty,
it does not necessarily follow that any individual member of the nation is
guilty. The connection between collective and individual culpability was
widely debated in the aftermath of World War II, as lawyers, philosophers,
and politicians debated the appropriate culpability of regular Germans for
the Holocaust.2 5 While some argued that the crimes of the German nation
entailed individual culpability for regular Germans, others argued precisely
the reverse: individual culpability could not be inferred from the simple fact
of being a German. Indeed, many did nothing, or actively resisted, or were
themselves victimized.2 6 How could they be culpable just by virtue of their
membership in a nation-albeit one that acted like a criminal syndicate
27
under Hitler?
The relevant difference between the case of German war guilt and the
modem criminal conspiracy is that the latter functions with a tighter
deliberative structure than the former. Decisions in a criminal conspiracy
are made in the form of group deliberations that involve, as will be
discussed in Part IV, a form of collective reason. This tightly knit form of
reasoning is not present when the "collective" in question is a massive and
loosely organized entity such as the German nation, composed of many

24

Doctrines of imputed liability are not entirely foreign to the criminal law, although the

literature is short on theories to explain them. See Robinson, supra note 14, at 617.
25 See, e.g., KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT (2000); see also George P.

Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective
Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002).

On this specific point, see Herbert Morris, George Fletcher and Collective Guilt, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 731, 737-38 (2003) ("There were Germans who were innocent infants
at the time, Germans who risked their lives in opposing the wrongs and, to take an extreme
case, there were Jews who were being persecuted, tortured, and killed who were also
German nationals.").
26

27

Id.
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individuals who do not participate in the process of group deliberations.28
Some Germans were mere bystanders.29
It is more fruitful to compare the criminal conspiracy with a more
structured entity such as a legislature, which has a formal decision-making
procedure that all members actively participate in. While conspiracies are
not as structured as legislatures, with formalized rules or bylaws, they often
have a decision-making structure that is generally followed by social
convention, even if it is not codified in writing. 30 It is quite common in the
case of legislatures to speak of collective intentions, though critics of
"legislative intent" often complain that legislatures cannot have intentions
in the same sense that people do, so it is nonsensical to ask what Congress
"intended" when it passed a particular law. 31 Even if we can resolve this
doubt, and attribute a collective intention to the legislature, it bears asking
whether we can attribute that intention back down to the individual
legislator.
This raises the special problem of dissenters. In Germany, many (or
some) opposed Hitler, either by hiding Jews, speaking out against his
policies (though this was rare and dangerous), or, in the most extreme case,
plotting Hitler's assassination.32 In the case of legislators, many vote
against an initiative, and at first glance it would appear absurd to attribute a
collective intention to them, since they did not even support the proposal.
This point bears scrutiny. When a legislator returns home to his district, he
can often escape criticism by noting that he voted against a particularly
loathsome proposal. In this capacity he appears as an individual defending
his voting practices. In other circumstances, though, the legislator may
appear as a representative of the legislature-or even the whole nation if he
is speaking with a foreign leader-at which point he may very well be
called to account for the collective action, and a disavowal by appealing to
his own dissenting position would appear inapposite.
When is it
28 Of course, the Nazi government was not loosely organized but was, rather, devastating
in its efficiency and cohesion. It is possible to distinguish here between the government and
the German nation.

See Morris, supra note 26, at 739.
See infra Part VII for an extensive analysis of these structures.
31For a discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990). See also Michael S.
Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 279, 350-51 (1985)
("Skepticism is warranted when we move from the further intentions of individuals to those
of a group of such individuals. One cannot, as I argued, make out either of the realist
conceptions of legislative intent. There just are not the group minds or shared intentions that
could give these conceptions of legislative intention any application."); Max Radin,
StatutoryInterpretation,43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930).
32 See Morris, supra note 26, at 738.
29

30
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appropriate to recognize that the individual has taken the collective decision
and made it his own? The analogue in the conspiracy is the criminal who
disagrees with a particular decision and is overruled, either by majority rule
or a contrary decision by the conspiracy's leader, but decides to remain in
the conspiracy anyway. How can the group's intention be imputed to an
individual dissenter within the conspiracy, sufficient to ground Pinkerton
liability?33
In order to determine whether collective intentions can be attributed to
individuals, we must first analyze the structure of conspiracies. The thesis
to be pursued here is that each individual who participates in a conspiracy
bears a certain relationship to the individual's thinking process, such that
attribution of the collective intention to the individual may be warranted in
certain limited circumstances. However, before doing so we must wait until
we have explained the structure of collective decision-making. The answer
will lie somewhere in the fact that once an individual injects himself in the
process of collective decision-making, it is not so easy to disentangle from
it. Final evaluation of this argument must be postponed until Part VII.
The contemporary literature has largely avoided such questions.
While appeal to the group intention of the conspiracy offers, at first glance,
the best solution to the Pinkerton paradox, the position is no longer
seriously entertained in the scholarly literature. There are two likely
reasons. The first and most pervasive is a distrust of the notion of a group
will. If the group "intends" to commit the substantive crime, does this
mean that the conspiracy has a mind of its own, like some kind of suprahuman animal? 34 Does each member of the conspiracy cease to exist,
falling out of existence and replaced by the hive mind of the conspiracy?
The notion seems to imply the existence of a unified group mind-an
outlandish concept. As Part III will demonstrate, discussions of "group
will" have long since been discredited in the law since the rise of legal
realism and legal pragmatism. While this view provided the mental and
objective elements for vicarious liability, the criticism was that it did so at
too high a price.
The origin of this problem can be seen in our very basic understanding
of what it means to conspire. We view the criminal conspiracy, rightly or
wrongly, as tightly woven in deliberation and purpose, in much the same
way that we regard corporations. Indeed, if one looks at the definition of a
conspiracy in the Oxford English Dictionary, one finds that to "conspire"
means, literally, to breathe together. 35 The prefix con means "with," of
33 For a detailed discussion of imputation, see Robinson, supra note 14, at 617.
34 See Moore, supra note 31, at 350.
35 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

783 (2d ed. 1989).
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course, and "spire" comes from the Latin spiro, spirare,meaning to blow,
or more figuratively, to breathe.3 6 Hence, conspirare means literally to
"breathe together," and by extension, "to accord, harmonize, agree,
combine or unite in a purpose, plot mischief together secretly. 3 7 The
association then is not just some loose collective endeavor. The collective
endeavor is a case of collective action so closely pursued that the
conspirators breathe together as if they are, in a sense, one being-one
animal. If this is what it means for a group to have a collective intention, it
does indeed sound outlandish.
The second rationale for dismissing the notion of a group intention is
that it might conflict with the basic individualistic precepts of the criminal
law. Criminal lawyers are inclined to view everything through the lens of
individual culpability, and rightly regard talk of group intentions as
inherently suspect. Indeed, the entire conspiracy doctrine demonstrates a
tension between collective action and individual liability. All conspiracies,
by definition, are pursued collectively.
However, conviction-and
punishment especially-are targeted towards particular individuals, who
must alone face the stigma and prison sentence associated with a criminal
conviction.38 Why should the conspiracy be treated like an atomic unit,
with each part bearing the same responsibility as the whole?3 9 For this
reason, any talk of a "group will" is regarded as inconsistent with the
Enlightenment principles of individual responsibility that the criminal law
is founded upon. Talking about a group will sounds too much like guilt by
association or blood guilt.
The goal of this Article is to revive the notion of a group intention,
without bringing with it the baggage of a corporate animal with a
psychological mind of its own. Ironically, developing this account of group
intentions will offer doctrinal implications in Part VIII that do more to
respect the individualistic precepts of criminal law and the principle of
individual culpability than the current Pinkerton doctrine. Failure to
consider the deliberative structure of conspiracies has allowed the criminal
law to ignore the required mental and objective elements for vicarious
liability, and has allowed expansive conspiracy doctrines like Pinkerton to

36 id.
37

id.

38

The conspiracy charge is one of the most frequently used tools by the modem

prosecutor. See Raphael Prober & Jill Randall, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 39 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 571, 572 n.9 (2002) (citing statistic that 4502 out of 70,114 federal criminal
defendants in 1997 were charged under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and another 15,630 were charged
under 21 U.S.C. § 846 or § 963). Statistics for Pinkerton liability are unavailable.
39 For a discussion of culpability, see infra Part VII.B.
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flourish. Charting the landscape of group intentions will offer a more
coherent answer to the mental and objective elements of Pinkerton liability.
Before we start this analysis by turning to the history of the law's
treatment of collective endeavors, we must first address an alternate route to
grounding Pinkerton liability. Theorists more comfortable with the tools of
economics than criminal law theory may simply argue that Pinkerton
liability is justified on efficiency grounds alone (because it deters crime),
and that no other theoretical justification is required for the practice. The
objection requires an explicit response.
C. THE EFFICIENCY OF PINKERTON LIABILITY
One way of expressing Pinkerton's logic is to claim that it deters crime
by increasing penalties for those who join conspiracies. Furthermore, one
might say that a criminal assumes the risk of Pinkerton liability when he
conspires with other criminals. 40 If potential criminals have adequate
advance knowledge of the penal law, they assume the risk that they will be
held criminally liable for the actions of their co-conspirators, even when
those actions fall outside the scope of the criminal agreement. The basis for
this assumption of risk is largely utilitarian. 41 There is adequate warning
for this prosecutorial scheme and this extended liability serves a cautionary
role meant to deter criminal behavior and provide increased incentives for
potential criminals to inform on their co-conspirators.42 If one sees the law
as a set of rules meant to incentivize repeat players to avoid criminal
behavior or, at the least, to flip on their confederates if they do commit
criminal behavior, then Pinkerton is just another rule along the golden path
towards efficiency.4 3
40

Borrowing the term "assumption of risk" from tort law, this justification emphasizes

that participants in a criminal conspiracy are aware-or should be aware-that federal and
state conspiracy statutes allow punishment for the foreseeable crimes of their co-conspirators
and that those who willingly participate in collective criminal endeavors take this risk upon
themselves. Although this idea is almost never articulated as a distinct justification, it is
nonetheless possible as an explanation for how vicarious liability might be consistent with
the criminal law's preference for criminal liability relative to an individual's personal
participation and culpability.
41 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 14, at 668 (discussing deterrence).
42 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1315 (2003); Daryl
J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REv. 345, 398-99 (2003) (discussing greater
liability risks for those who join conspiracies and concluding that "[c]onspiracy law raises
the costs of group crime").
43 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1193 (1985) (deriving basic criminal prohibitions from the concept of efficiency). Indeed,
Posner argues against the conventional wisdom that American criminal law notions such as
conspiracy, as well as liability for mere "preparatory activit[ies]," are based on moral
character and not on economic theory. Id. at 1194-95. Posner goes to great length to
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Efficiency justifications are problematic when viewed against the
background constraint embodied in the criminal law principle of nulla
poena sine culpa, or no punishment without personal culpability. 44 The

principle codifies our natural intuition that no global utilitarian justification
is sufficient to impose punishment on the innocent, regardless of the
possible gains in efficiency or overall welfare.4 5 The culpability principle
has a long history in the legal and philosophical literature, and extends back
to the very origins of criminal justice.4 6 While new rules regarding criminal
liability may be debated and imposed, they are constrained by the
requirement that they match the individual culpability of the defendant in
question.47
establish the economic rationale (in terms of efficiency) for these doctrines, noting that the
efficiency gains (from the criminal's perspective) of pursuing criminal conduct in a
conspiracy are offset by the increased liability risk. Id. at 1214-19.
44 See Kai Ambos, Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law, 4 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 660 (2006) (discussing centrality of culpability principle). In Germany,
the principle is codified not only in national penal law, StGB § 46(1), but also its
constitution. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 20(1) (F.R.G.). Although the principle
of culpability is more often discussed in the European criminal law literature, it has
nonetheless long been recognized as a basic principle of American criminal law. See, e.g.,
FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 499-500 (discussing Model Penal Code's treatment of
culpability); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 129 (1947) (noting that
"punishment [should be] proportional to moral culpability"); Paul H. Robinson, Four
Predictionsfor the Criminal Law of 2043, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 897, 903 (1988) ("I predict that
the criminal law will move toward greater adherence to the principle of culpability."). That
the principle is not more often discussed in the U.S. literature is perhaps simply a reflection
that European criminal law journals are more dominated by criminal law theory than their
American counterparts.
45 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 153 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1984) (describing rights as trumps against a political goal for the entire
community). Within the criminal justice system, the idea of rights as trumps gains renewed
urgency. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and
Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1259 (2005) (invoking Dworkin and noting decline in
concern for substantive fairness in the criminal justice system).
46 See Mirjan Dama~ka, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM.
J. COMP.
L. 455, 464 (2001) (noting that all national legal systems subscribe to the principle that
"people should be held accountable according to their own actions and their own mode of
culpability"). However, Damaika concedes that the doctrinal consequences of the principle
differ across national legal systems, and "requirements flowing from it are not equally
demanding." Id. Nevertheless, the culpability principle can only be displaced in cases of
regulatory offenses and minor crimes where strict liability is appropriate. Id. Dama~ka calls
these cases "morally neutral offences." Id. For discussion of the principle's significance,
see FLETCHER, supra note 13, at 191-92 (describing culpability problems with the conspiracy
doctrine); Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Willful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the
"Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principleof Legality,
1994 WIS. L. REv. 29 (1994).
47 Although U.S. constitutional arguments rarely appeal to the principle of culpability, it
nonetheless lurks in the background without explicit mention. For example, the Supreme
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A rich understanding of the culpability principle is required. It is not a
mere threshold requirement.
It is not sufficient to demand that
punishment-regardless of its level or severity-be limited to individuals
who display some degree of culpability. The principle does more than
simply protect the absolutely innocent. Rather, the principle embodies
elements of degree and proportionality. To punish an individual who bears
only minor culpability (for, say, a minor crime) with a lengthy punishment
(for, say, a much greater crime) is to engage in the most severe utilitarian
balancing.i
The point of criminal justice is that such utilitarian
considerations be tempered by at least some deontological constraints:
punishment must be relative to a defendant's culpability 49 and culpability

cannot be generated by anything other than wrongful action.
Efficiency justifications for Pinkerton risk violating this broad
conception of the culpability principle. Whether the conspirator "assumes
the risk" that his co-conspirators might stray from the criminal plan, or
simply embodies our utilitarian desire to provide disincentives for criminal
conduct, he cannot suffer punishment that exceeds his culpability. Some
story must be told that connects his criminal liability and punishment with
his degree of culpability in the overall criminal endeavor. Otherwise, the
defendant is being used as a contingent means to achieve greater social
Court has held that grossly disproportionate punishments (e.g., the death penalty for adult
rape) violate the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. See
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Arguably, the implicit principle behind such
arguments is that grossly disproportionate sentences violate a constitutional right because the
sentence exceeds the individual's culpability.
48 The Supreme Court has reversed harsh sentences on this ground, though only
occasionally invoking the language of culpability. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
293 (1983) (invoking the culpability of the offender as one factor in a disproportionality
analysis); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (discussing culpability of robbery
accomplice who received death sentence under vicarious felony murder doctrine). But see
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding sentence of consecutive twenty-fiveyear prison terms for petty theft conviction under Califomia "three strikes" statute).
49 A few philosophers have argued that utilitarian considerations need not be tempered
by a philosophical notion of desert. See, e.g., GALEN STRAwSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF
(1986) (questioning the very principle of moral desert); Derek Parfit, Comments, 96 ETHICS
832, 839 (1985-1986) [hereinafter Parfit, Comments] (arguing that desert and responsibility
are irrelevant). Cf DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 323-26 (1984) (earlier position
that desert is not absolute but can vary by degree). However, Parfit's later view is extreme;
he argues that no one ever deserves to be punished for their conduct and that the entire
institution of punishment can be justified on utilitarian grounds alone. See Parfit, Comments,
supra, at 839. Not only does this yield intolerable consequences-innocent defendants could
be punished purely for social utility-but it would also require fundamentally altering our
philosophical attitudes about criminal justice as well as the institution of punishment itself.
Almost every other philosopher operating within criminal law theory accepts some account
of moral desert as a necessary constraint on punishment. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert,
Punishment, and CriminalResponsibility, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47-49 (1986).
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goals; this flies in the face of the criminal justice's longstanding goal to
adjudicate individual culpability. 50 This is the business of the criminal law.
Efficiency justifications for Pinkerton do more than simply violate the
culpability constraint. These justifications ignore the decision-making
structure of the conspiracy: the fact that some members orchestrate and
direct, while others execute and support. 5 There are many different ways
that a conspiracy can be structured,52 and in each case, the collection of
information and the making of decisions (including the formation of
criminal goals and strategies for achieving them) are pursued in very
particular ways. The conspiracy is not some abstract, atomic unit. It is a
collective endeavor with an internal deliberative structure that carries both
rational and legal relevance.
Ignoring this internal structure carries more than just moral
implications-there are legal and pragmatic considerations as well. The
internal deliberative structure of the conspiracy charts the reasons that a
group of individuals engage in criminal conduct, and it is precisely these
reasons in which the penal law seeks to intervene. Consequently, an
agent's reasons for acting are always relevant, regardless of whether one
focuses on culpability or efficiency. For the criminal law scholar, the
reasons provide a roadmap to moral desert; the rational deliberative
structure explains the culpability of the defendant. For the efficiency
theorist, reasons provide the backdrop against which incentives will either
succeed or fail. 53 It does not matter that the former is generally backwardlooking and the latter is generally forward-looking; both theorists need to
understand the rational deliberative structure of the conspiracy. Another
way of putting the general point is that reasons provide a causal explanation

50 Although it is possible to ground criminal justice in utilitarian norms, one cannot
totally give up deontological constraints on punishment. At least some non-consequentialist
account must partially undergird the institution of punishment. Although my argument does
not depend on acceptance of these deontological constraints, it is important to recognize that
however one expresses the non-consequentialist restraints on punishment, they will
necessarily come back, at some level, to a concept of individual culpability. This is
inescapable. For a discussion, see Weinreb, supra note 49, at 47-49 (arguing that utilitarian
justifications for punishment covertly fall back on the concept of desert). The alternativepunishing non-culpable defendants purely for the sake of deterrence-is unjust.
51 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 43, at 1218-19 (making no distinction between different
kinds of conspiracies).
52 See infra Part V.
53 This point is often overlooked. It is fallacious to think that consequences can be
charted independently of an agent's reasons. In order to affect outcomes, consequentialists
must carefully chart an agent's reasons for acting and then carefully craft incentives to alter
them.
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for actions.54 If one wants to change an agent's actions, one had better
intervene with incentives by changing an agent's reasons for acting.5 5 In
order to accomplish this, the efficiency-seeker must carefully evaluate the
decision-making structure of the agent.
III. THE ORIGINS OF GROUP AGENCY

Since the notion of a "group will" is so promising for solving the
Pinkerton riddle, it would stand to reason that the internal structure of a
criminal conspiracy would be well worked out in the literature. In fact, the
question has been largely ignored in the criminal law literature on
conspiracy. Why has the literature failed to see that the conspiracy's
collective intention provides the mens rea for a co-conspirator's substantive
offense? This Part offers that explanation by examining the law's historical
treatment of collective endeavors and, in particular, the status of
corporations-the group endeavor of greatest concern to the law. It will
become clear through this analysis that legal scholarship long ago rejected
the notion of a "group will" as psychologically implausible and, in any
event, inconsistent with the tenets of legal realism.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, legal scholars were
particularly concerned with the increasing legal status of corporations.56
Indeed, the debate was a holdover from the nineteenth century that was
never resolved. In particular, the scholarly literature, heavily influenced by
French, German, and Italian treatise-writers, became particularly concerned
with justifying this treatment by virtue of some foundational story about the
"nature" of corporations.5 7 These debates centered on the classic distinction
between "natural" and "artificial" persons-a distinction that shows up in

54 See Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND
EVENTS 3, 4 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that "the primary reason for an action is its cause"); see
also SIMON EVNrNE, DONALD DAVIDSON 41 (1991) ("What is special about actions is that

they are events performed by people for reasons. They are done intentionally. What is
important about descriptions if they are to reveal an event as an action is that they related the
event to the agent's reason for performing the event.").
55 See Davidson, supra note 54, at 8. Davidson concludes that when we look at the
primary reason for which an action was accomplished, the "action is revealed as coherent
with certain traits, long- or short-termed, characteristic or not, of the agent, and the agent is
shown in his role of Rational Animal." Id. This analysis makes it possible to reconstruct a
"syllogism" that explains why the agent performed the action, i.e., "from the agent's point of
view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action." Id. at 9.
56 See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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as diverse places as the political theory of Hobbes58 and the international
relations of Vattel 9
Quite quickly, three schools of thought emerged. 60 The first school
contained several theories united by the proposition that the corporation
was a "real" person by virtue of its organization.6 1
Many of these
arguments appealed to various foundational elements that explained the
"real" nature of the corporation. For example, the corporation had a will or
"directedness," if not a soul in religious terms. 62 Some of these theorists
were quick to point out that the fact that the corporation was, in some sense,
artificial (i.e., created), did not entail the view that the corporate person was
not real.63 Of course corporations were constructed out of "natural"
persons, the argument went, but the corporation's status as a person was
nonetheless required by virtue of the facts on the ground.64 The corporation
65
was a real person.

58 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88 (Richard E. Flathman & David Johnston eds., 1997)

(1651) (distinction between natural and artificial persons).
59 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 12, at 3 (Joseph Chitty ed.,

Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1853) (1758) (describing states as moral persons under
international law).
60 The literature contains variations on each theory, though for simplicity it is possible to
group related theories into three basic categories.
61 See, e.g., W.M. GELDART, LEGAL PERSONALITY 7 (Clarendon Press 1924) (1910)

(distinction between natural and juridical persons); OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF
THE MIDDLE AGE (Frederic William Maitland trans., 1900); A.V. Dicey, The Combination
Laws as Illustrating the Relation Between Law and Opinion in England During the
Nineteenth Century, 17 HARV. L. REV. 511, 513 (1904) ("When a body of twenty or two
thousand or two hundred thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular way
for some common purpose, they create a body which by no fiction of law but by the very
nature of things, differs from the individuals of whom it is composed."); Arthur W. Machen,
CorporatePersonality,24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911).
62 This view was most associated with Ernst Zitelmann, who argued that corporate
persons were real precisely because they were directed by a "will." See Machen, supra note
61, at 256-57.
63 See, e.g., GELDART, supra note 61, at 94.
64 See Machen, supra note 61, at 257 (noting that "an artificial lake is not an imaginary
lake").
65 Id.
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A second school of thought, often identified with Savigny 66 and
Brinz, 67 rejected the supposed "reality" of the corporate person and
suggested that the corporation was a fictional entity. 68 This was not to
suggest that corporate activities were illusory. Rather, it was simply to
suggest that the corporation itself, as an entity, could be reduced to its
component parts (its individual members), and that any attempt to think of
the corporation as a real person was to mistake a fictional entity for a real
being. 69 Talk of corporate persons was just that-afacon de parler.70 This
linguistic shortcut facilitates our discussions about corporations and their
legal relations in particular.
A third school of thought, somewhat less known than the first two,
suggested that the legal power of the corporation flows from some positive
grant of power, either from the legal system or a governmental authority,

66 FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS, BAND 2,

283 (1840) (theory of juridical personhood stemming from basic definition of persons as
right-holders). Savigny distinguishes between, on the one hand, natural persons whose
natural status makes them valid holders of rights and, on the other hand, juridical persons
such as corporations that are mere fictions but nonetheless eligible for similar rights by
extension. Id. at 236. For an excellent explanation of Savigny's theory, see Miguel Tamen,
Kinds of Persons, Kinds of Rights, Kinds of Bodies, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 1, 18-23
(1998) (discussing Savigny's notion of "representation" with regard to individual man and
corporations).
67 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 439 n.82 (2000) (discussing Brinz and Saviguy's theories of
corporate personhood); Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate
Personality Controversy and Comparative CorporateGovernance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583,
632 n.3 (1999) (Brinz's purpose theory). The Brinz theory was called the Zweckvermdgen
theory-the German word for purpose. See Machen, supra note 61, at 256.
68 The fictional theory was, in part, a reaction against the perceived excesses of the real
entity theory, which often exaggerated the degree to which the real entity was a corporate
organism, endowed with a will and performing actions with a corporate "body." See
Machen, supra note 61, at 256 (describing the "grotesque lengths" to which the real entity
theory was taken, including the view that the corporate animal is endowed with a will, sense,
and the capacity to procreate, just like a biological animal); see also George F. Canfield, The
Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 17 CoLUM. L. REV. 128 (1917). For a
discussion of the development of the fictional theory, see Morton Horwitz, Santa Clara
Revisited: The Development of CorporateTheory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); Sanford A.
Schane, The CorporationIs a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction,61 TUL. L. REV. 563
(1987).
69 See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (noting that a
corporation is "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law"); Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 88 (1809) ("It is defined as a mere
creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorporeal.").
70 Dewey attributes the origin of the fiction theory to Pope Innocent IV, who argued that
ecclesiastic bodies could not be excommunicated.
See John Dewey, The Historic
Backgroundof CorporateLegal Personality,35 YALE L.J. 655, 665 (1926).
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which allows the corporate endeavor to proceed. 7' This theory, sometimes
referred to as the "concession" theory, emerged from a general distrust of
group action as threatening the liberty of the individual, and as possibly
threatening to either the sovereign or ecclesiastical powers.72 As such, only
one of these authorities could authorize group agency, and without this
"positive sanction," the corporation, or any other similar collective
73
endeavor, was a nullity.
The debate between these three approaches raged on for many years,
until a variety of intellectual developments in the American academic scene
converged to displace them. Philosopher John Dewey wrote an article in
the Yale Law Journal that pointed to the essential "emptiness" of the
debate.7 4 Specifically, Dewey concluded, "In saying that 'person' might
legally mean whatever the law makes it mean, I am trying to say that
'person' might be used simply as a synonym for a right-and-duty-bearing
unit. Any such unit would be a person; such a statement would be truistic,
tautological., 75 Essentially, under Dewey's view, the only thing at issue is
which rights and which duties ought to be assigned to the modem
corporation. This was a real issue for legal scholars and practitioners to
debate.76 However, any further debate about the supposed "reality" of the
corporate person was overly metaphysical and lacking in philosophical
77
significance. The critique was entirely in line with Dewey's pragmatism.
We were wrong to think that if legal philosophers figured out if
corporations were "real" persons, this conclusion would have any
implications for how corporations should be treated. Rather, the label
See ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897).
See Dewey, supra note 70, at 666-67.
73 See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 39 (1917)
(identifying as a Middle Ages theory that "communal organization not sanctioned by
prescription or royal license" was illegal). This concept became religious doctrine, so that
communal organization without church authority was prohibited. Id. Freund concludes that
corporate existence itself is a function of public policy made explicit by legislative
enactment which provides for the legality of corporate structures, a limitation and
requirement not imposed on natural persons and their actions. Id. For a discussion of
Freund's theory, see Dewey, supra note 70, at 667.
74 See Dewey, supra note 70, at 655-56.
71 Id.at 656.
76 See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (due
process for corporate persons); Santa Clara County v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886)
(Fourteenth Amendment protections extended to corporations).
77 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, in 12 THE MIDDLE WORKS (1982). For
other formulations of philosophical pragmatism, see WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1975)
(discussing appropriate goals for intellectual inquiry). In Rorty's famous (and more
contemporary) formulation, if it makes no difference to inquiry, it should make no difference
to philosophy. See RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS 19 (1998).
71
72
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"person" simply representedthe fact that our legal system had decided, for
other reasons, to confer rights and duties on the corporation. The language
of personhood signaled nothing more.
Dewey's pragmatism won the day, and debates about the legal
personality of corporations evaporated, or at the very least changed in a
significant way. No longer were the philosophical questions debated; they
were dismissed as being overly metaphysical.78 Although corporate law
flourished in the coming decades, with increasingly complex doctrines, the
metaphysical status of the corporate persons was not on the research
agenda.79
The corporate person debate was further sidetracked, or rendered
irrelevant, by the subsequent rise of the legal realists. 80 During the twenties,
thirties, and forties, the legal realists came to prominence by claiming that
legal decisions were made by recourse to many extraneous factors implicit
in the contingent nature of human reasoning, and that the course of legal
scholarship was to understand these processes.8 ' Under this view, the
prospect of figuring out the metaphysical status of corporate persons was
scholarly bankrupt. 82 Indeed, the realists believed that understanding the
metaphysical nature of corporate persons would have no discernible impact
on the study of corporate law, which was better studied with an eye towards
Indeed, Felix
the particular ways that legal disputes were decided.
Cohen's famous realist manifesto, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functionalist Approach, made particular reference to the corporate
78

See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, FreestandingLegal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZo L. REv. 21,

25-26 (1996).
79 See David Luban, What's PragmaticAbout Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
43, 65-66 (1996) (arguing that coherent legal arguments presuppose philosophical positions).
Luban goes on to note the number of legal absurdities, particularly in the area of corporate
conspiracies, caused by the under-theorized nature of corporations after Dewey made his
argument. Id. at 70-72.
80 The rise of legal realism was not solely responsible for the change. There were
already currents of anti-metaphysical attitudes in American legal scholarship from which the
fountain of legal realism sprung. Indeed, Machen cites a long list of European treatises on
the subject of corporate personhood published in France, Germany, and Italy at the turn of
the century, and then bemoans that "[o]ur complete oblivion to all this wealth of
controversial learning strikingly exhibits the insularity of our English law." See Machen,
supra note 61, at 254; see also JULIus BINDER, DAS PROBLEM DER JURISTISCHEN
PERSONLICHKLEIT (1907); LtON MICHOUD, LA THtORIE DE LA PERSONNALITt MORALE (1906

& 1909).
81 See generally Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM.
L. REv. 431 (1930).
82 See Dewey, supra note 70, at 673 (noting that "the entire discussion of personality,
whether of single or corporate personality, is needlessly encumbered with a mass of
traditional doctrines and remnants of old issues").
83 See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
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personhood debate, signaling it as a prime example of overly metaphysical
reasoning, the kind he derided as being part of the "special branch of the
science of transcendental nonsense."8 4 After Cohen and the rise of the other
legal realists, no major scholar of corporate law has seriously entertained
the metaphysical status of corporate persons. It has, perhaps rightly, been
dismissed as unnecessarily foundational-i.e., seeking metaphysical
justifications for our contemporary legal practices-a long-since-discredited
goal of legal scholarship.
The important thing to understand about the pragmatic and legal realist
rejection of the corporate personhood debate is that its implications spread
far beyond the domain of corporations. Just as the metaphysical status of
corporations was not considered a legitimate discussion for legal
scholarship, so too the discussion of any other group entity-trade unions,
associations, nations-was considered illegitimate. 86 This certainly accords
with how Geldart et al. viewed their enterprise. 87 They believed they were
fighting about more than just corporations; their debate encompassed trade
unions, 88 associations, and the state, as well as more nebulous associations
such as conspiracies. 89 Indeed, the whole debate was about collective
endeavors and their structure; 90 corporate personality was just the most
obvious example of what was, in fact, a much broader problem. It is
therefore not difficult to see how the rise of legal realism dampened not
only discussions of corporate personhood, but also of other collective
endeavors such as conspiracies.
With this historical background, it is clear why the current scholarship
has largely ignored the abstract question of the internal structure of
conspiracies. The question smacks of the very kind of overly philosophical
question that legal scholars have been trained to ignore since the rise of
84 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalistApproach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935).
85 See generally Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 268 (1997) (explaining connection between naturalized
epistemology of Quine to legal realism).
86 See Cohen, supra note 84, at 820 (discussing broader
problem of metaphysical
concepts in legal reasoning).
87 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
88 See Dewey, supranote 70, at 669.
89 Cf id at 666 (describing minor organizations like conspiracies).
90 See FREDERICK

HALLIS,

CORPORATE PERSONALITY

xvii (1930) (offering broad

conception of legal personhood extending beyond business corporations);
MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS

FREDERIC

VOL. 3 307 (1911); Dewey, supra note 70, at 656 n.23

(defining "corporate" in its broadest sense as including all collective bodies, whether
technically incorporated or not); id at 662 n.8 (English statutory definition of "person"
included all persons, incorporated or unincorporated, unless otherwise stated); Bryant Smith,
Legal Personality,3 YALE L.J. 283, 289 (1928).
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legal realism. 9 Worse still, attributing a "group will" to a conspiracy in
order to resolve the mens rea problem in Pinkerton would appear to return
to the worst excesses of the corporate personality debate: continental,
theory-laden doctrine that anthropomorphizes the conspiracy into a suprahuman animal with a magical group mind. As such, discussions of
Pinkerton either focus on aligning liability incentives with desired
outcomes or analyzing the actus reus and mens rea without any reference to
the group's intentions. 92 The result is that Pinkerton suffers from an
unresolved tension.

IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS
A. ELIMINATING CONSPIRACY
The broadest possible solution to the Pinkerton riddle is to eliminate
not just Pinkerton but the entire law of conspiracy (including the inchoate
offense) and return the criminal law to its traditional focus on individuals.
Previous criticisms of the conspiracy doctrine have called it an unnecessary
doctrine, an overambitious prosecutorial tool that ought to be eliminated. 93
The law of conspiracy could, of course, be replaced by classic categories of
perpetration, including principal and accessory liability.94 A more
individualistic account would, no doubt, be capable of adequately charting
the individual culpability of each defendant according to his criminal
conduct. If this were the appropriate avenue, then the Pinkerton riddle
would disappear.
However, I argue in this section that such an individualistic account is
unwarranted.
The language of conspiracy, though currently flawed,
captures the often collective aspect of modern criminal behavior.95 Once
we start looking around, group action is more strongly represented than we
91 Compare Luban, supra note 79, at 68-70 (rejecting Dewey's argument about persons),
with Grey, supra note 78, at 28-29 (defending legal pragmatism against Luban's attack).
92 See Posner, supra note 43, at 1218.
93 See Johnson, supra note 12, at 1137 (1973); see also Note, Developments in the Law,
Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 922 (1959); cf Sanford Kadish, Complicity,
Cause, and Blame: A Study in the Interpretationof Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REv. 323, 362-63

(1985) (noting that "[e]ven those who defend the doctrine concede that it is an extension");
Noferi, supra note 13, at 95-104 (canvassing theoretical justifications for vicarious
conspiracy liability); Robinson, supra note 14, at 666-67.
94 For a discussion, see Jens David Ohlin, Commentary on Stakic, in ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 2008) (analyzing principles

of perpetration in the conspiracy doctrine). See also ROxIN, supra note 19 (discussing
hegemony-over-the-act theory of perpetration).
95 See Katyal, supra note 42, at 1309-10 (discussing pervasive nature of criminal
conspiracies).
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might have realized-individuals often coordinate their actions to produce
increasingly complex criminal operations that were once unthinkable. Gone
is the image of the lone gunman on horseback robbing banks or resorting to
highway robbery; the arch criminal of the future will be the leader of
syndicates, directing subordinates to engage in isolated acts of criminal
behavior that, when coordinated together, produce immense criminal
gains. 96
Nowhere is this more painfully obvious than in international criminal
law. There, the central crimes of concern to the international community
are genocide and crimes against humanity.97 Genocide is the historical
clash between peoples locked in existential battle-one group seeks the
destruction of the other and implements a policy or plan designed to bring
about that group destruction. 98 These crimes are necessarily pursued at the
collective level, for without a coordinating policy or plan, there is no
genocide. 99 Genocide is therefore the attempt by one ethnic group to
eliminate another. Crimes against humanity are pursued, at the very least,

96 See id

at 1319.

97 The other major crime of concern to the international community is aggression, though

it has not been prosecuted since Nuremberg. See Jens David Ohlin, Aggression, in OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 17. Aggression is a collective
crime because it occurs at the intersection of individual and state responsibility for
aggressive war, and as such at the intersection of international and criminal law. At
Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal ("IMT") refused to convict Nazi leaders for
conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity, mostly because continental
judges believed that the American conspiracy doctrine was an unwarranted imposition of
collective liability. However, the IMT did convict for conspiracy to wage aggressive war on
the theory that aggression was necessarily collective in nature anyway. See ANTONIO
CASSESE,

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

LAW 111-14

(2003); Jonathan A. Bush,

"The

Supreme... Crime" and Its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of
Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324 (2002).
98 For a defense of this view of genocide, see generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS
DAVID OHLtN, DEFENDING HUMANITY (2008) (discussing irreducibly collective nature of

genocidal crimes, informed by historical paradigm of the phenomenon). This view
admittedly differs from the Rome Statute, which at least in theory recognizes the possibility
that one person might commit a genocidal act without participating in a larger genocidal
endeavor by a group. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, U.N.
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
However, this hypothetical case is best categorized as a hate crime, not genocide. The
historical paradigm of genocide is the clash of ethnic groups, one of which seeks the
destruction of the other, and pursues collective conduct to achieve that destruction.
99 Cassese argues that the widespread or systematic nature of genocide is not part of its
legal definition. See CASSESE, supra note 97, at 100. Nonetheless, Cassese does argue that
the widespread nature of the attacks is an essential objective element of the legal definition
of crimes against humanity. Id. at 64-66. This requirement is codified in article 7 of the
Rome Statute.
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at the platoon level, if not higher in the chain of command by civilian and
military authorities who authorize rape, forcible transfers and deportations
of civilian populations (more commonly known as ethnic cleansing), and
murder.100 Large-scale planning is required by those involved in these
cases in order to implement the widespread destruction that makes these
cases "of interest to the international community as a whole."' 1 War
crimes are often, though not always, collective in nature. For example,
when a platoon engages in war crimes by causing disproportionate harm to
innocent civilian populations, these actions usually result from the platoon
activities that implicate a collective.102 It is rare to have target selection
handled exclusively by an individual soldier. These decisions come down
from the chain of command.
Collective crimes are not limited to the international context and
domestic prosecutors now use the conspiracy charge in a large percentage
of their cases. 1 3 Organized crime, drug dealing, and financial crimes are
just three examples where group criminality is the norm. In these contexts,
individual criminal conduct, unsupported by a network of fellow criminals,
would be an exception requiring explanation.' 0 4 It is important that
criminal law doctrine remain faithful to the increasingly collectivized
elements in criminal behavior. Eliminating conspiracy as a mode of
liability in favor of an individualistic account of perpetration would fail to
capture these essential characteristics.
Moreover, it is important that one's criminal law doctrine remain
sensitive to these exterior facts. This goal is not necessarily self-evident.
Some might ignore criminal law doctrine, not caring whether it matches the
facts on the ground. Better to be concerned, they might say, with
promoting the right outcomes, regardless of whether the doctrine conforms
to the general structure of criminal behavior. There are two obvious
answers to this anti-theoretical objection. First, producing a clear doctrine
to model contemporary criminal behavior is an a priori good. It is just
better for the law to be theoretically sound, to work around a set of doctrinal
distinctions that are coherent. More importantly, though, a good doctrinal
1oo
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ICTY Trial Judgment (Aug. 2,
2001) (describing the coordinated plan to commit ethnic cleansing and genocide of Bosnian
Muslims in Srebrenica that resulted in 7000 to 8000 deaths).
101See Rome Statute, supra note 98, at pmbl. ("Affirming that the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by
enhancing international cooperation.").
102 See CASSESE, supra note 97, at 100.
103 See Prober & Randall, supra note 38, at 572 n.9.
104Id.

JENS DA VID OHLIN

[Vol. 98

account of group behavior might be required for instrumental reasons. It is
foolish to believe that one could find a doctrine that does not correctly
model group criminality and still end up with the "right" outcomes, either in
terms of morality or efficiency. 10 5 This would be shocking if it could be
accomplished. The right doctrine is not just a matter of dreaming up a
theory that is un-tethered from the facts on the ground. Rather, the doctrine
is used to explain correctly the behavior of the agents in question, which, as
it turns out, is precisely the world in which we are seeking to produce the
"right" outcomes. It is impossible to produce the "right" outcomes unless
one is working with a rich theoretical model that correctly shows how
group criminal behavior is produced. Otherwise, one cannot properly
structure incentives that will change these behaviors.
The proper response is therefore not to eliminate the law of conspiracy,
as some have hastily suggested, but to reform it. 10 6 One ought to develop a

rich doctrine of group criminality that recognizes certain basic facts: the
increasingly collective nature of criminal behavior; the diverse structure
that these conspiracies can take, both in decision-making and execution;
and the distinct roles that individuals can play in these conspiracies. Each
of these three elements is relevant for a defendant's culpability, and the
Pinkerton doctrine should remain faithful to them. Specifically, a new
model promises to explain how it is possible for a conspiracy to have a
group intention sufficient to provide the mens rea and actus reus for
vicarious liability.
B. THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION
Those who argue that the law of conspiracy should be eliminated seek
to analyze group criminality at the level of individuals. 107 This strategy
accords with the increasingly individualized tendencies of Enlightenment
thought and the history of liberalism, which views the sanctity of the
individual as of paramount importance. Groups are seen as ephemeral,
derivative, or a mere faqon de parler; it is individuals who matter.
Therefore, it would make sense for the criminal law to reduce conspiracies
to the actions of individuals. This conclusion would suggest that the proper
avenue for reforming the law of conspiracy, including Pinkerton, is to
eliminate it entirely.

105 See Katyal, supra note 42, at 1307; Posner, supra note 43, at 1195.
106 See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 13, at 192 (questioning whether conspiracy should be
replaced with notions of perpetration and complicity); Johnson, supra note 12, at 1137
(arguing for elimination of the doctrine).
107 This view is consistent with the position taken by FLETCHER, supra note 13, at 192,
and Johnson, supra note 12, at 1137.
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Such elimination would be unwarranted. Although this point is often
not recognized in the current literature on conspiracy, we must treat the
group aspect of collective endeavors seriously, because this is the only way
to understand group behavior. By invoking recent developments in the
literature on rational choice theory, it is clear that the rational choices of
groups can only be considered by analyzing them as groups, and that any
attempt to reduce group level decision-making to individual decisionmaking will fail to capture the rational choices made by group
deliberations. Recent work in this area has demonstrated this conclusion,
although it appears to have gained little traction in criminal law theory.
The philosopher Philip Pettit, for example, has argued that group
rationality cannot be reduced to individual rationality.' 0 8 To understand
Pettit's argument, it is important to reconstruct each stage carefully. First
consider the so-called "doctrinal paradox"-the subject of much discussion
in the legal literature since the 1990s. 10 9 Consider a three-judge court
deliberating on a tort matter. The decision rests on two predicate questions:
did the defendant owe a duty of care, and did the defendant's negligence
cause the injury in question? 1 ° Only if both of these factors are true should
the defendant be liable. Now, assume that the first judge finds a duty of
care but rejects the causation prong. He therefore votes "no" on the
question of liability. The second judge finds no duty of care, though he
does believe that the defendant's actions were the cause of the injury. He,
too, votes "no" on the question of liability. The third judge finds both a
duty of care and causation, and so he votes in favor of liability. The general
jurisprudential question to be decided is how the court should conduct the
voting. If they take votes just on the question of liability, two judges (a
majority) will vote against it. If, however, they vote for each component
issue separately, the result will be the exact opposite. Two of the judges
(the majority of the court) have concluded that the defendant owes a duty of
care. Furthermore, two judges (also a majority) have concluded that the
defendant's actions caused the injury in question. When taken together,
108 See

Philip Pettit, Collective Persons and Powers, 8 LEGAL THEORY 443 (2002),

reprintedas Groups with Minds of their Own, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS 167 (Frederick

Schmitt ed., 2004) [hereinafter Pettit, Collective Persons]. The issue is also discussed in
Pettit's article with Christian List, On the Many as One, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 377 (2005).
109See, e.g., Lewis A. Komhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1, 10-13 (1993) (showing how doctrinal
paradox emerges from viewing appellate adjudication as a collective enterprise).
110Pettit reverses the order of the two questions, which seems strange, but does not
impact the force of his argument. See Pettit, Collective Persons, supra note 108, at 444.
One cannot call the defendant's actions "negligence" unless one has first decided that a duty
of care was owed. That is why standard tort doctrine considers duty as the first prong of a
negligence analysis-but the issue is immaterial here.
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these two results generate liability. Pettit calls one the conclusion-centered
procedure and the other a premise-centered procedure."' Obviously, one
can find any number of examples in legal reasoning that generate the same
paradox. Some legal bodies, such as at the Supreme Court, use the
conclusion-centered procedure," 2 but other legal arenas, such as jury
decisions that require official factual determinations of a long list of
predicate factual questions (e.g., special interrogatories), use the premisecentered procedure." 3 The problem shows up whenever there is an
overlapping majority for the premises in question." 4 There are two votes
for each premise, but only one individual who actually votes for both
premises.
The important point about the doctrinal paradox is that it results from
any group deliberations that involve multiple premises that are logically
related to each other. Pettit refers to this generalized phenomenon as the
"discursive dilemma," although the name is not terribly important." 15 The
important thing to recognize is that it is a generalized phenomenon of group
deliberations. It shows up in legal reasoning, it shows up in political
voting, and it shows up in collective deliberations. It will show up in large
groups-say for example, national elections-and it shows up in small
groups (say, for example, three people in a kitchen deciding how to plan
their day at the beach). It also does not matter how many premises are
involved. Although the calculations will get more complicated to diagram,
a complicated decision procedure with n-premises will suffer the same fate.
Where I disagree with Pettit is when he concedes that "the paradox
may still seem unlikely to figure much in ordinary social life," citing
Sunstein for the proposition that people in social groups "will often reach
collective decisions on an incompletely theorized basis."'" 16 Pace Sunstein,
any social group engaged in collective deliberations will suffer the same
fate, even though the participants may not be aware of it or capable of

" Id at 452.
112

Supreme Court Justices vote based on final outcomes, often to the point of

incoherence. The issue is discussed in Komhauser & Sager, supra note 109, at 14
(discussing aberrant votes by Justice White in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989), and Justice Kennedy in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)).
113 See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for
Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 115 (2003) (discussing aggregation problems
created by jury fact-finding).
114 Pettit demonstrates that the problem appears whenever "[a]ny collective of
individuals.., coordinate their actions around the pursuit of a common purpose ......
Pettit, Collective Persons,supra note 108, at 452.
15 See id. at 446.
116 Id.at 449 (citing CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999)).
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articulating, with theoretical sophistication, the dilemma they face.1 17 But
the fact that they cannot fully explain the dilemma does not mean that the
issue does not arise.
The basic prongs of the dilemma-and here we continue to evoke
Pettit's argument-are that the group can either maximize rationality at the
collective level or the individual level. If they wish to treat themselves as
individuals, they will tally up the votes on the conclusions and be done with
it. 118 If, on the other hand, they reason as a group, they will resolve
contradictions at the group level, and insist that the relation of the premises
to the conclusion be logically consistent across the group. 11 9 If the group
believes that Premise One holds and the group also believes that Premise
Two holds, then the group must also believe in liability as a conclusion, on
pain of contradiction. This is the hallmark of group rationality.120
Now here is the rub. In cases where the group is acting in this kind of
integrated way, one must analyze its actions at the level of the group in
order to understand its behavior. To reduce the group to a set of atomic
individuals will fail to capture the reasons behind the group's final
determination. It is precisely because the group seeks to maximize reason
at the global level that its actions can be properly interpreted. In such cases,
failure to consider the group dynamics blocks our ability to interpret the
group's actions and make sense of their behavior.' 21 Otherwise, one must
assume a level of irrationality, which is clearly unwarranted when it is
evident that the group is engaged in purposive activity. This is the essence
of the Charity Principle-we ought to assume that when interpreting

117 Indeed, Pettit at other points seems to recognize this fact, as when he states that
"purposive groups will almost inevitably confront examples of the discursive dilemma and
that, short of resorting to deception, they will be under enormous pressure to collective
reason by practicing modus ponens-as in the premise-centered procedure-rather than
modus tollens." Id. at 452.
118 This method is usually used by the Supreme Court in its voting practices.
See
Michael I. Meyerson, The IrrationalSupreme Court, 84 NEB. L. REv. 895, 899-900 (2006).
119 If the group uses the premise-centered procedure, they are practicing modus ponens;
if the group uses a conclusion-centered procedure, they are practicing modus tollens. See
Pettit, Collective Persons, supra note 108, at 450.
120 Nothing in this account suggests that criminals are perfectly rational, nor even that
they are just as rational as non-criminals. Rather, criminals remain committed to the process
of rationality in the sense that rationality is the structure of thought and deliberation. One
cannot reason over time unless one is committed to the norm of rationality.
121 Understanding an agent's reasons for acting is paramount to understanding their
behavior, including their linguistic behavior. In doing so, one assumes that an agent is acting
more-rather than less-rationally. This is the essence of the Charity Principle. See Donald
Davidson, Radical Interpretation,in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 125, 13435 (2001).
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behavior we are presented with more, not less, rationality. 122 Recognizing
the natural outgrowth of this
the group-level rationality here is simply
123
interpretation.
behavior
of
commitment
C. CONSPIRACY AS A COLLECTIVE ENDEAVOR
We must obviously connect this work on group agency with our
particular account of conspiracies. Do conspiracies usually follow this
pattern? It would be wrong simply to assume that the modem-day criminal
conspiracy fits this description of the rational group agent. In fact, the
analysis here will suggest that in many cases the modem conspiracy does
not. However, there is something about this notion of collective reason that
is nonetheless entirely applicable to collective criminal endeavors.
Why do many groups necessarily collectivize reason? Groups with a
common purpose will be required to pursue their actions over time.
Common purposes are to be distinguished from simple, atomic actions that
can be completed in a single moment. A common purpose requires a plan
for implementation and requires that simple steps be aggregated together to
complete a collective endeavor. This is the essence of a criminal
conspiracy: a plan.
124
Plans require, necessarily, deliberation and action over time.
Judgments at one point in time must be related to judgments at subsequent
points in time. Moreover, the group, insofar as it is committed to a
common purpose, will feel constrained by its previous deliberations and
an attempt to achieve some
judgments. 125 There will be, in other 1words,
26
time.
over
unity
rational
overall
kind of
Of course, one might add, the group is not constrained by previous
judgments in some hard and fast way. The group may very well change its
mind-but this is precisely the point. The group does not ignore previous
judgments on matters that are essential to the plan's success. Rather, the
group takes ownership of these judgments during the course of their
122
123

Id.
On the connection between group agency and the principle of charity, see Carol

Rovane, Charity and Identity, in DONALD DAVIDSONS PHILOSOPHIE DES MENTALEN (W.
Kohler ed., 1998) (arguing that charity demands that we posit group agency before we posit
irrationality).
124 See Christine M. Korsgaard, PersonalIdentity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian
Response to Parfit, 18 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 101, 109-15 (1989) (discussing life plans and
agency over time).
125 This kind of self-constraint would appear to be implicit in the notion of deliberation.
For a discussion, see Philip Pettit & Michael Smith, Freedom in Belief and Desire, in FREE
WILL 388, 389 (Gary Watson ed., 2003) (referring to the conversational stance that agents
take toward one another).
126

See CAROL ROVANE, THE BOUNDs OF AGENCY (1998).
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deliberations, and if the judgments are to be disavowed as wrong or no
longer applicable, the group will likely have reasons for doing so-for
changing its mind, as it were. If the previous judgments were simply
irrelevant, the group need not have any reasons at all for the new beliefs.
It is in this sense that conspiracies, as collective criminal endeavors,
will demonstrate some kind of rational deliberative structure over time.
The conspiracy will be organized around a common purpose-say a theft or
a murder-and will engage in collective decision-making that necessarily
takes place over time. There will be an attempt to relate the various
judgments that take place over time rationally in order to maintain a
sensible strategy. If, for example, the group decides that poison is the best
strategy, the group at a later point will start selecting poisons. For the
group to start selecting guns would simply make no sense unless the group
first went back and revised its original judgment. The point here is that
without such a revision, the second judgment would be irrational. It would
not make sense.
Group conspiracies will actually go so far as to enforce this collective
rationality on its members. If, after the decision to use poison is taken, one
member of the conspiracy started shopping for guns on behalf of the group,
this type of behavior would be discouraged. The important point is that this
standard of group-level rationality would be imposed even if the individual
in question had dissented from the poison vote and had voted in favor of the
shooting strategy. It would not matter. The group would insist on overall
rational unity at the collective level and would insist that the dissenter,
and
127
other outlying members of the conspiracy, get with the program.
Consider another example. A group of thieves decides to start stealing
credit card numbers. They have two general options for getting the
numbers. As the first option, they can use computer equipment to breach
the mainframe of a large retailer and electronically download an entire
database of credit card numbers. The downside of this process is that it is
difficult and the numbers will probably be encrypted, and the group is
unsure of its ability to crack the encryption code. The second option is to
pay-i.e., bribe-individuals who work for the retailer on the inside to turn
over the credit card numbers before they are encrypted. Based on a general
sense of the perceived chances of success, the group pursues the second
avenue of bribery. After the bribery plan is initiated, one member of the
conspiracy, who didn't like the plan anyway, uses common money to
purchase the kind of large computer system required for the hacking. This
type of behavior would not be supported and the group would require that
the collective plan be followed.
127For a discussion of overall rational unity at the group level, see id at 146.
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There is something about collective endeavors that requires that reason
be collectivized. 128 Although legal decisions by a tribunal can be made with
either the premise- or conclusion-centered approaches, collective
endeavors, whether criminal or not, require premise-centered approaches or
else the cohesion of the group plan falls apart. Actions can only be
coordinated together if the group operates with a minimal level of collective
rationality. If individuals pursue the whole plan independently of each
other, the result is hardly a conspiracy. It would be nothing more than
multiple individuals who happen to be working toward a similar goal, but
without any effective coordination of their activities. 129 This is the opposite
of a conspiracy. This is more like crowd
behavior: independent actions that
30
result.
aggregate
an
to
lead
to
happen
It should be noted that nothing in this account presupposes that the
decision-making process of the conspiracy is democratic. It would be
absurd to think that all criminal conspiracies vote on all strategic questions
as if they were a body politic running a plebiscite on every issue. Indeed,
conspiracies are often hierarchically organized, with the authority to make
final decisions delegated to a smaller group within the overall conspiracy.
Some members of the conspiracy may have a greater say than others (they
may get "more votes" by virtue of their perceived authority within the
criminal organization). Some might get more influence because they have
pledged key assets (say, capital) without which the conspiracy cannot
proceed. Regardless, the conspiracy will have some definite decisionmaking structure, whether democratic, oligarchic, or plutocratic, and once
the decisions are made, they will become the group's decisions, in a
fundamental sense, as opposed to merely the decisions of those in the group
who supported them. The result is a true group agent dedicated to a
common criminal endeavor through collectivized rationality.
V. THE SOLUTION OF OVERLAPPING AGENTS
We have so far considered the degree to which collective endeavors
may qualify as a form of group agency, and that group agency, properly

128

This point is implicit in Pettit's argument and the discussion of the doctrinal paradox.

All collective decision-making structures will face pressures to collectivize reason. See
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and The Many: Integrity and Group
Choice in ParadoxicalCases, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249, 251 (2004) ("The possibility of a
paradoxical distribution of preferences or judgments of this sort is not unique to courts; in
principle, a paradoxical distribution of views can arise in any group of three or more persons
faced with a decision that can be broken down into at least two constituent subdecisions.").
129 See PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CoRPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 68 (1984)
(distinguishing between crowds and corporations).
130

Id.
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understood, cannot be reduced to individual action.1 31 When individuals
work together toward a common purpose, they often engage in collective
reasoning that can only be understood as rational by looking at it from the
perspective of the group agent. It is for this reason that, at first glance, it
makes sense that the criminal law should look to the conspiracy itself for
the requisite mens rea for Pinkertonliability.
Nonetheless, we must return to our original anxiety, expressed at the
beginning of this Article, that an account of group intentions sufficiently
robust to provide the mens rea necessary for Pinkerton liability will
inevitably require us to adopt an unwieldy theory of the conspiracy as a
corporate animal that breathes together with a group will and a suprahuman mind. 132 However, if we properly chart the deliberative structure of
a common criminal endeavor, it will become clear that no such theory is
required. Rather than thinking of the conspiracy as a group animal, all we
have to do is recognize that such groups are composed of individual agents
who decide to collectivize reason, i.e., to reason collectively. The salient
characteristics of the criminal conspiracy are its capacity to engage in
reason-giving and reason-demanding behavior, the normative stance that
the outside world may take with regard to the conspiracy, 133 and the
131For another example of an argument for the irreducibly collective aspect of group

behavior, see John R. Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS 1N
COMMUNICATIONS 401-15 (Philip R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990). Searle argues that individuals
who engage in joint behavior can only be understood as having a "we-intention," i.e., an
intention to engage in joint behavior. A we-intention cannot be reduced to an "I-intention,"
Searle argues, otherwise we lose the distinction between individuals who engage in joint
projects for the sake of achieving joint goals and individuals who engage in individual
actions that they believe will contribute to large consequences. Cf RAIMO TUOMELA, A
THEORY OF SOCIAL ACTION (1984) (arguing that group intentional behavior can be reduced
to individual actions). For further discussion of the issue, see MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES
OF INTENTION 114 (1999) (arguing that shared intentions consist of multiple attitudes and
their interrelations); CHRISTOPHER KuTz, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE
AGE 88-89 (2000) (discussing agents who have overlapping intentions). See also George P.
Fletcher, Law in Searle, in JOHN SEARLE 85 (Barry Smith ed., 2003).
132 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
133 By normative stance, I mean simply the posture that one agent will take toward
another agent. Agents treat one another differently than they treat the natural world, which
can only be described in scientific terms or with other causal properties. Other agents,
however, can be held to account to certain prescriptive or normative standards. It is possible,
in other words, to demand a certain kind of behavior from another agent, and then call that
agent to account when they fail to live up to that norm. It would be senseless to treat the
external environment in this manner. The normative stance is therefore one of the hallmarks
of human agents and their relationships with each other. See, e.g., ROVANE, supra note 126
(describing ethical-regarding relations); Pettit & Smith, supra note 125, at 389 (describing
the conversational stance). Pettit and Smith argue that holding an interlocutor to certain
normative standards of rationality is implicit in conversation itself, otherwise one would
have no reason to treat an interlocutor seriously.
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normative stance that the conspiracy takes with regard to its own
members.' 3 4 Nothing more is required.
The first important point to make is that rational agents can cut across
biological lines.1 35 This general point can be inferred from what we said in
the previous section on group agency, 136 but it bears repeating in a more
general way. What matters for rationality is a certain deliberative process
and a commitment to hold beliefs together in a rational way, i.e., choose
between conflicting goals and then pursue those goals by formulating the
necessary plans to achieve them. 137 All of this is done with the usual
machinery of rational thought: transitive ordering of preferences and the
many other elements that we take to be constitutive of basic rational
thought. 138 The important thing to remember is that this rational unity often
exists in individual human beings, but this is not the only case of rational
unity. As described in the above section, rational unity can be achieved in a
group of human beings committed to collective deliberation and collective
action. 139 It is clear that the relationship between rational unity and a single
biological human being is contingent-not necessary. It is possible for
140
rational unity to cut across the dividing lines that biology provides for us.
This should not be surprising. The freedom of the human mind, coupled
with the human capacity for communication, allows us to transcend (to
some degree) our biological singularity. Although our thoughts are
134 Individual members of a group conspiracy are sometimes held to certain standards by
the group as a whole. When individual members violate these standards, they are subject to
sanction by the group. For example, a collective criminal group may have certain
expectations about privacy and secrecy regarding their operations-a norm which the group
will be strongly motivated to enforce against any member who violates it.
135 For a discussion of individual agents who overlap to form a group agent, see Carol
Rovane, What Is an Agent?, 140 SYNTHESE 181 (2004). Rovane develops the central idea of
collective agents whose boundaries cut across the bodies of individual human agents,
although she does not refer to them explicitly as "overlapping agents."
136 See supra Part IV.B-C.
137 This notion is implicit in Rovane, supra note 135, at 189, as well as in ISAAC LEVI,
HARD CHOICES: DECISION MAKING UNDER UNRESOLVED CONFLICT 151-52 (1986) ("[E]ven

students of market economies attribute beliefs, desires, goals, values and choices to families,
firms and, of course, government agencies.").
138 See Rovane, supra note 135, at 183 (outlining normative requirements of agency).
139 See supra Part IV.B-C.
140 The idea that rational agency is not confined by human biology has long since
been
recognized. While it is true that human beings almost always demonstrate unity of
consciousness within a single biological brain, there is nothing that requires that rational
unity be confined to a single human brain. On the distinction between rational unity and
unity of consciousness, see Korsgaard, supra note 124, at 109-15; Marya Schechtman,
Experience, Agency, and PersonalIdentity, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1 (2005). The issue is
also discussed in Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human
Rights?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 235 n. 118 (2005).
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necessarily psychologically unified in one mind, we are free to forge
rational relations across multiple minds.
This key point about rational unity encourages us to think more
critically about how it comes to pass that an individual human being joins a
collective endeavor, and what this says about an individual human being's
deliberative capacity and their relationship to a larger deliberative group.
When an individual joins a group deliberation, she makes a commitment to
submit her reasons to collective rationality in order to achieve rational unity
at the group level. This commitment, as it were, is constitutive of the
41
notion of collective deliberation, as we showed in the previous section.
What is crucial, however, is that the individual does not submit her entire
psychology to the group mind. Her thoughts, in a sense, remain her own.
What she does submit to the group endeavor, however, is her reasons,
transmitted through the regular channels of interpersonal communication.
There is no hive mind here, no group mind with unified thoughts in the
42
same way that human beings have direct access to their thoughts.
Indeed, individuals who participate in such endeavors rarely submit all
of their reasons to the group agent. If, for example, an individual joins a
criminal conspiracy dedicated to money-laundering, he makes a
commitment to pursue rational unity at the group level pertaining to issues
relevant to money-laundering. Note carefully that rational unity is different
from psychological or phenomenological unity. While the former means
that reasons are related together in a common deliberative scheme, the latter
implies a unified center of consciousness and the direct sharing of
thoughts. 143 A conspiracy demonstrates unity in the former sense, not the
latter. Therefore, a conspirator helps the group make decisions about
money-laundering and possibly other criminal activities that are subsidiary
to the money-laundering. In some criminal organizations like the mob,
joining the collective endeavor means collectivizing reason for all of the
individual's criminal activities-no additional freelancing outside of the
criminal organization is allowed. This rule depends on the criminal
organization and the background rules for membership, but regardless, the
141 See supra Part III.B-C.
142The point here is that rational unity in a group does not require that all members have

direct access to the group's reasons. The traditional skepticism about group minds and
group wills was that a group such as a corporation or legislature only has indirect access to
its reasons because each part of the group has to talk to each other to communicate these
thoughts. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 31, at 350. In a human being, by contrast, mental
states are unified because one individual has direct mental access to all of his mental states.
However, the idea of rational unity in a group does not require this kind of mental or
psychological unity-it requires only the unification of reasons, a relation that does not
presuppose mental unity.
143See Korsgaard, supra note 124, at 109-15.
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criminal does not submit reasons regarding his personal life to the decisionmaking process of the group agency. 144 Some elements of his life, and the
rational deliberations related to it, remain segregated from the collective
endeavor. The individual therefore only joins the criminal organization
with regard to one particular facet of his existence. Other elements of his
existence-say his love life, his parenting, or his religious beliefs-are not
submitted to the group agent.
This demonstrates that the individual who joins a collective endeavor
maintains two centers of rational unity. There is one center of rational unity
that deals with the criminal's personal life as well as elements of his
professional life that are irrelevant to the criminal endeavor. There is a
second center of rational unity that combines with other agents to form the
kind of joint deliberation that we have described. There is therefore a
commitment to overall rational unity across several human beings with
regard to this one limited endeavor. One might describe this phenomenon
as one of overlapping agents. 145 The conspiracy is formed by individual
human beings, each of whom retains individual autonomy, but each of
whom willingly agrees to turn over a segment of their reasons to the
collective endeavor. The conspiracy is formed as the overlap of these
individual agents.' 46 This model explains how individual agents join a
group endeavor yet remain autonomous from it at the same time. They
participate in the collective endeavor but are not subsumed by it.
Individuals belong to, and stand apart from, the group agent at the same
time. They donate a portion of their lives to the group agent but not the
entirety of their existence. The result is a series of overlapping agents, each
of whom retains individual autonomy but gives up that autonomy in one
area of their life in furtherance of a joint criminal goal. This is hardly a
difficult phenomenon to visualize; every soldier who joins a military unit
understands that they give up their autonomy (in some matters) in pursuit of

This point is emphasized by Rovane, supra note 135, at 193-95 (discussing examples
of undercover FBI Agent Donnie Brasco, as well as the participants of the Manhattan
Project).
145 See generally Rovane, supra note 135 (using a term other than "overlapping agents").
146 Kutz also analyzes collective action in terms of an overlap, although he is concerned
solely with an overlap of intentions. See KuTz, supra note 131, at 94-95. Under this
account, collective actions are formed when two or more individuals have individual
intentions to participate in a common endeavor. However, these overlapping intentions
should not be confused with the view expressed here, which depends more explicitly on joint
participation in a common rational point of view that is formed from the overlap of multiple
144

agents.
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collective goals. Perhaps this is why the 1law
of war was so quick to
47
recognize the collective aspect of war crimes.
A. THE DELIBERATIVE STRUCTURE OF CONSPIRACIES
With this model, we can now begin to explain the deliberative
structure of a conspiracy. This explanation is essential if we are to maintain
that group deliberations are sufficiently integrated to yield collective
intentions of the sort that might ground the mens rea for Pinkerton. First,
the conspiracy wants to achieve its criminal goal and will resolve problems
that threaten to frustrate it. Reasons are ranked against each other and
contradictions are resolved.
Of course, this does not mean that the
conspiracy achieves anything close to complete rational unity. 148 This is far
from the truth. Rather, it simply means that there is a joint commitment to
purposive action. 149 Second, we should make the distinction between
sharing information and sharing decision-making authority. In some cases,
members of a conspiracy will share decision-making authority-either by
democratic means or something well short of it-with each other. In other
cases, members of a conspiracy will simply share information, while one
member of the conspiracy engages in decision-making. These variations
will present subtle questions to be examined in the next section. However,
it is sufficient for the moment to simply note that information sharing and
deliberation, even if it falls short of final decision-making, can implicate
shared deliberation. But
the nature of this deliberation must be postponed
50
until the next section.'
Finally, we should point out another hallmark of conspiracy which
makes clear its status as an overlapping agent: the conspiracy is capable of
adopting a normative stance in that it can engage in reason-giving and
reason-demandingbehaviors. 151 By reason-giving, I simply mean that the
conspiracy can give reasons for its actions and articulate how the decision-

147 Individuals cannot commit crimes against humanity by themselves. Article 7(2)(a) of
the Rome Statute, supra note 98, requires a "widespread or systematic attack" that must be
"pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack."
148 See Rovane, supra note 135, at 186.
149 Id.
150 See infra Part VI.D.
151 See JONATHAN BENNETT, RATIONALITY: AN ESSAY TOWARDS AN ANALYSIS

(1964);

PHILIP PETTIT, THE COMMON MIND: AN ESSAY ON PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS

235

(1993) (discussing the "conspiratorial aspect to the reconstructive style of intentional
explanation" and concluding that "[wie get on side with the agents under investigation; we
get to breathe with them, in the etymological sense of 'con-spire"'); Frederick Schauer,
Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633 (1995) (reason-giving as commitment).
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making process leads to its completed actions.152 To the extent that the
conspiracy's reasons are insufficient to justify a stated course of actioni.e., they are irrational-the conspiracy will be forced to admit that it should
revise its decisions to conform to the demands of rationality.1 53 By reasondemanding, I simply mean that the conspiracy can demand that others give
reasons for their actions and that the conspiracy can call others to account
for their rational failures. Think, for example, of the pressure that the
conspiracy might bring to bear against any of its members who act in ways
that contradict the considered judgment of the group. In such cases, the
group can demand reasons from the individual member and bring various
normative pressures to bear on him, depending on the values of the agents
involved. This process of demanding and giving reasons is a classic
example of the ways that rational agents interact with each other, and this is
precisely what is going on when a conspiracy holds one of its members to
account for his actions.
B. WHY WE SHOULD ACCEPT THIS ACCOUNT

There are at least five distinct reasons why we should view a
conspiracy as an overlapping agent.
1. The Mens Reafor Vicarious Liability
With the overlapping agents view, there is no need to posit the
existence of a supra-human group will with a hive mind and a unified
psychology. There is no mystery to how agents can collectivize reason in
such a way that they have the requisite mens rea that allows for, say, Daniel
Pinkerton to be convicted for the crimes of Walter Pinkerton, even if Daniel
was in jail at the time. In that case, the two individuals formed a collective
endeavor dedicated to tax evasion and the group itself intended the crime.
This explains why the mens rea can be attributed to Daniel; he participated
in the deliberative process that produced the collective intention. However,
the collective intention was created from simple rational connections
between the individuals, not a corporate animal that "breathes" together.
Furthermore, the account also explains how Walter's acts can be attributed
to Daniel, because the act in question was causally produced from the same
collective intention and, again, Daniel participated in producing that
collective intention.

152

Pettit's view is that the "capacity to think is superveniently dependent, at least in part,

on the relations involved in intrapersonal or interpersonal interaction." PETTIT, supra note
151, at 178.
153 See PARFIT, supra note 49, at 118-19 (discussing reasons and deliberation).
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Some might balk at the suggestion, so a couple of analogies would be
helpful. Orchestras produce collective music, and the symphony itself can
be attributed to the orchestra because each instrument plays individual notes
that combine together to form the symphony. However, would it be correct
to then attribute the symphony to the first violins? In a sense not, since they
only play the violin part, but in another sense, yes, in that once the music is
aggregated in the form of a symphony, each instrument's individuality
fades into the background and is overshadowed by the collective sound. An
army is a similar group. The army is made up of soldiers, but if you train
your gaze on the battlefield at large, you see the movements of armies, not
individual soldiers. Patton's Third Army charged across Europe. This is
more than just a shorthand description for naming the thousands of soldiers
who drove tanks or engaged in any of the various component actions that
made up the march. There is something called the Third Army that makes
this description true.
In the case of conspiracies, individuals who collectivize reason have
submitted themselves to a collective deliberation for one reason: their desire
to pursue a criminal goal by acting with a unified purpose. Of course, not
all conspiracies are unified to this degree, a point that bears careful scrutiny
in Part VI. 154 Nonetheless, as we have shown in Part IV, the reasons of the
group cannot be reduced to the reasons of individuals.1 55 Once individuals
join a group that requires collective reason, their individuality fades to the
background, overshadowed by the collective action in which they
participated. In a sense, the conspirator is like the violin player: one can see
him in two lights, either as an individual or as a group. But this paradox is
more than just a gestalt image-it is a function of the overlapping nature of
these agents. The conspirator can be treated as both individual and group
because, in a sense, he is both, engaging in collective reason towards a
dedicated criminal pursuit but also maintaining his own autonomy in his
personal life. Pinkerton straddles this distinction, in that it imputes the
collective intention of the overlapping agent to the individual criminals.
Once an individual becomes entangled in the collective reason of a
conspiracy, he cannot disentangle himself from its collective intentions
unless he withdraws. He also cannot disentangle himself from its actions,
thus solving the objective element of the Pinkerton riddle as well. One can
attribute the wrongful act of a perpetrator to his fellow conspirators because
the act was causally produced by the collective intention of the group.

114 See infra Part VL.A-C.
155

See supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
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2. Withdrawal
This view also explains how agents join and withdraw from a
conspiracy. One of the mysteries of a conspiracy is how a free and
autonomous agent can rationally decide to join the conspiracy, be subsumed
by it, but still maintain sufficient autonomy to withdraw from the
conspiracy at a later date. The model of overlapping agents explains how
this phenomenon is possible. Individual agents simultaneously stand inside
and outside the conspiracy, keeping one foot committed to the collective
endeavor and the collectivized reason it demands, yet also maintaining a
portion of their private lives separate and not rationally unified with the
group agent. It is from the standpoint of his continuing and persisting
individual center of agency that the conspirator can decide whether it is
rational, based on an all-things-considered judgment from his individual
point of view, to join or withdraw from the conspiracy.
3. Flipping
The overlapping model also shows how an agent can rationally pursue
group goals and individual goals (say by flipping or implicating other
members) at the same time. 156 Consider the example of a street-level
enforcer in an organized criminal mob. The enforcer is approached by the
FBI, which tells him that the agency is close to bringing down the
organization with indictments. They tell him that the result is inevitable
and just a question of timing-the writing is on the wall. They offer him a
deal, including witness protection and relocation, in exchange for his
testimony and cooperation. Now, it is clear that it would be within the
enforcer's self-interest to consider the deal, i.e., it is rational, all things
considered. It is equally true that, from the perspective of the conspiracy,
cooperation is not in its best interests. Indeed, its very survival depends on
the refusal of its members to cooperate with the authorities. We are
therefore left with a slight conundrum. The decision to withdraw and turn
state's evidence is both rational and irrational, depending on the point of
view taken. From the enforcer's point of view as an individual, withdrawal
is clearly rational; from the enforcer's point of view as a member of the
group, withdrawal is clearly irrational because it harms the collective
interest. 157 How can both be true? They are indeed both true, because the
156 Flipping

is a crucial concern for Katyal, supra note 42, at 1328. Katyal's theory does

not provide an account for this, but flipping could be both rational and irrational depending
on one's point of view. The view presented here explains this fact.
157 This example could be expressed as a version of the Prisoner's Dilemma, where
cooperation is rational from the group perspective, but from the individual perspective
defection is most preferable because the individual has no assurance that cooperation can be
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enforcer is wearing two hats. In his private life he acts as an autonomous
agent, capable of making an all-things-considered judgment about the best
course of action. In his professional life, though, he acts as part of a group
agent composed of overlapping individual agents, each of whom is
committed to deliberating a course of action in common. Furthermore, it is
from the perspective of his private life that the enforcer judges the
rationality of joining the conspiracy. It is also from this private perspective
that the enforcer judges the rationality of leaving the conspiracy. Even
though he joins the conspiracy, he never fully gives up his private life and
his ability to conduct private deliberations about the suitability of his
participation in the collective agent.
4. Culpability
As a fourth point, the overlapping agent model of conspiracies
promises, at least at first glance, the possibility of solving the problem of
culpability. Earlier we suggested that blanket Pinkerton liability was
problematic because it imposes total liability for all members of the
conspiracy, regardless of their level of culpability. 58 The charge was that
Pinkerton liability ignored the internal structure of the conspiracy and
treated it as a single agent without internal differentiation. It should now be
clear that thinking of the conspiracy as a set of overlapping agents with
intertwined but often distinct deliberations opens up space to explain how
the different parts of a conspiracy function. 159 The conspiracy is composed
of many different agents, each of whom may play a slightly different role in
the deliberative structure of the conspiracy-roles which may be legally
significant.
5. Incentives
A fifth and final advantage of the model of overlapping agents for
conspiracy is that it aids intervention in criminal behavior through the
construction of incentives to deter behavior. The overlapping agents model
160
helps explain the complicated psychology that participants may exhibit.
They feel in one sense committed to the collective endeavor, yet in another
capable of independently evaluating, from a distinct perspective, their
guaranteed. On the collective and individual aspects of the Prisoner's Dilemma, see DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986).
158 See infra Part VII.B for a detailed analysis.
159 This is only a preliminary answer. A more fully formed discussion of the internal
structure of conspiracies must wait until infra Part VI.
160 Katyal's article is dedicated to discussing the empirical studies of this complicated
psychology, though there is no background theory to explain how conspiracies could yield
such complicated psychological patterns. See Katyal, supra note 42 passim.
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commitment to this group project. The criminal law, by seeking to deter
behavior, takes advantage of this cleavage, and at times attempts to open it
further by giving the criminal additional reasons to withdraw from the
conspiracy and turn on his confederates. Therefore the criminal law,
insofar as it seeks cooperation, takes advantage of the dual role of the
conspirer. If the conspiracy was not formed from the parts of overlapping
agents, this would not be possible. As a final point, if the criminal law is to
make use of these incentives effectively, it must first understand the
deliberative structure of these overlapping agents. Only then can the
incentives be constructed in such a way that they become reasons for the
individual agent to withdraw and betray.
C. CONFERRING PERSONHOOD ON THE CONSPIRACY
One final point remains. If this model is correct and conspiracies
really are overlapping agents, why not go the full route and confer legal
personality on the conspiracy? We have stopped at calling it a group agent
or a collective endeavor. The law already treats other group agents as legal
persons, including corporations, labor unions, political parties, and even
nation-states within international law. 16 1 Some might believe that the
arguments presented above warrant conferral of personhood on criminal
conspiracies, which could then be hauled into court and prosecuted as a
(not just its directors)
group entity in much the same way that a corporation
162
can be the subject of a criminal prosecution.
Many factors counsel against this strategy. 163 There were special
factors requiring the conferral of legal personhood in the case of
corporations, none of which are present in the case of conspiracies.

161
162

See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized

Inquiry into the Problem of CorporatePunishment,79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 386 (1981).
163 Some might object from the opposite direction and argue that the overlapping agent's
similarity to a group person is a reductio ad absurdum, which shows that we have gone too
far in anthropomorphizing the criminal conspiracy. This objection would be motivated by
the same distaste for metaphysics that leads advocates of the fictional entity theory to oppose
the real entity theory. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. Have we gone too far
in positing a human will to the criminal conspiracy, in much the same way that nineteenth
century continental theories went too far in attributing a will and soul to the modem
corporation? This objection ought to be dismissed, for our account of overlapping agents
relies on nothing more than the commitment of multiple individuals to pool information and
deliberate in common. No greater psychological connections are either required or
suggested, nor have we posited the existence of some group "will" or abstract soul. We have
simply noted the degree to which these groups collectivize reason for the purpose of criminal
action.
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64
Corporations engage in economic ventures that the law seeks to facilitate.'
Conferring full personhood on corporations allows them to enter into
contracts, sue breaching parties for damages, and generally protect fiduciary
interests in a court of law. Furthermore, corporations can own property and
are even covered by constitutional protections such as the right to be free
65
from unreasonable search and seizures and other due process protections.
Although some of these legal rights also implicate corresponding legal
duties, 166 in general they are beneficial to the economic interests of the
corporation and promote collective economic endeavors.
Economic
efficiency is increased, arguably, if the corporation is allowed to appear and
directly press its own interests from within the legal system. This economic
incentive does not apply to the case of conspiracies. Indeed, the criminal
law wants to dissuade, not encourage, collective criminal behavior, and
conferring legal personhood on conspiracies (or criminal organizations)
would do nothing to help that process of dissuasion. In fact, it might even
67
harm it.'
Furthermore, the special demands of criminal justice-especially
individualized punishment-make conferral of legal personality particularly
problematic for group criminal endeavors. This Article began by noting
that the criminal justice system is necessarily individualistic. Only
individuals can serve prison sentences. 168 And while it is technically
possible for a group agent with collective assets to pay a fine, it is
impossible to throw a group agent into prison without also imprisoning the
individual agents from which it is composed. 169
Conferring legal
personhood on the conspiracy itself would not only fail to advance the
interests of the criminal law, but would actively harm them.

64 Cf Machen, supra note 61, at 263 (discussing both legal rights and legal
responsibilities of corporate persons).
165 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
166 Corporations are not only subject to criminal and civil liability, but are also

increasingly subject to evolving international standards of human rights. See generally Eric
Engle, Extraterritorial Corporate Criminal Liability: A Remedy for Human Rights
Violations?, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 287 (2005-2006).
167 See Katyal, supra note 42 passim.
168 For a discussion of this paradox, see Coffee, supra note 162, at 386. However, some
judges have tried to work around the difficulty. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny
Bottling Co., 695 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Va. 1988) (sentencing a corporation to three years'
imprisonment). The court attempted to seize the assets of the corporation under the theory
that "imprisonment" implied only some kind of physical restraint, though the stone walls and
iron bars of the typical prison were not the only way to achieve physical restraint. Id. at 86061.
169 See Allegheny Bottling Co., 695 F. Supp. at 861 ("Cases in the past have assumed that
corporations cannot be imprisoned, without any cited authority for that proposition.")
(emphasis omitted).
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What is needed is a Pinkerton doctrine that recognizes that the
conspiracy is the intersection of both individual and collective action:
individuals who maintain their autonomy yet collaborate in limited ways for
the advancement of a common criminal goal. The overlapping agents
model does exactly that. It provides a model that can make subtle
distinctions in the internal deliberative structure of a conspiracy, i.e., show
that it has movable parts whose distinctions are morally and legally
significant. That being said, we have not yet made any of those
distinctions. The task of the next section will be to offer them and to show,
in a preliminary way, the different internal deliberative structures that a
conspiracy might have.
VI. THREE KINDS OF CONSPIRACIES

In this section we will chart the different internal deliberative
structures that a conspiracy might have and give examples of each. Three
distinct kinds of conspiracies will be presented and then evaluated to
determine whether their deliberative structure is sufficiently cohesive to
yield vicarious Pinkerton liability, consistent with our understanding of the
relevant mens rea and actus reus requirements. The three kinds of
conspiracies do not represent an empirical or sociological account of how
conspiracies actually operate but rather a conceptual analysis of the
different ways a conspiratorial group could conceivably be organized. The
final section of this Article will then explore how the Pinkerton doctrine
should be reformed.
A. TIGHTLY KNIT VERTICAL CONSPIRACIES
We will call the first type of conspiracy the tightly knit vertical
conspiracy.170 This conspiracy is vertical because the decision-making is
hierarchical and members at the top make the final decisions, which are
then executed by those lower in the conspiratorial hierarchy. Nonetheless,
although lower members do not contribute to actual decision-making, they
do participate in the deliberative process by pooling information and
pushing it up the hierarchy. This makes the conspiracy tightly knit and
distinguishes it from a looser organization that pursues a common collective
170The terms "vertical conspiracy" and "horizontal conspiracy" are well known in
antitrust law, although they are used for different effect. In that context, a vertical agreement
to commit antitrust violations such as price-fixing links, say, a manufacturer with distributors
and retailers. A horizontal conspiracy, by contrast, connects horizontal competitors to
restrict competition.
See generally Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing: The
Horizontal/VerticalDichotomy in DistributorTermination Cases, 38 EMORY L.J. 311 (1989).
These definitions differ from the ones used in this Article, which emphasize instead the
connections between architects of the conspiracy and their enforcers.
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endeavor, but with little or no coordination. By contrast, the tightly knit
conspiracy pursues deliberation with a procedure that demands that
information be pooled. There is an expectation among members that
relevant information will be relayed back to some command individual at
the end of the day or some other predetermined time period.
A good example of a conspiracy with top-down decision-making and
pooled information is a mafia family.1 71 The head of the family makes all
decisions about common criminal endeavors.1 72 Although he may delegate
some decision-making authority to the captains below him, these delegated
decisions are always subject to review and reversal by the head of the
family.' 73 Furthermore, the criminal endeavor is tightly knit in the sense
that the family expects that information on criminal activities will be shared
and pooled together so that the best decisions can be made. Individual foot
soldiers do not roam the streets without direction, generally pursuing
mayhem.174 They engage in discrete actions, under orders from above, and
then report back all relevant information to their superiors, who then pass
along the information to the rest of the group. Some members of the mob
family may, for reasons of individual interests, withhold information from
the rest of the group, thereby preventing the group from achieving total
information-pooling. It is important to distinguish the interests of the
individual qua individual from the interests of the group as an overlapping
agent. The individual member may face some tension as he decides
whether to pool a particular piece of information. Say the foot soldier
receives a visit from an FBI agent seeking cooperation.' 75 The foot soldier
may realize that it is in the group's interest to hear about this friendly visit,
but doing so puts him and his family at great risk. This kind of dilemma is
to be expected, and it is important to distinguish the group's commitment to
information-pooling from its achievement of that goal. While they may fall
short of the goal, they remain committed to it at the group level. Indeed,
the mob family that finds out that an individual family member has hidden

171See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 425 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing
"general structure of La Cosa Nostra"); United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th
Cir. 1988) (discussing "command system of a Mafia family"); United States v. Bledsoe, 674
F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982) (discussing "organizational pattern or system of authority" and
command structure of Mafia).
172 See, e.g., Tocco, 200 F.3d at 425 (discussing family structure and Tocco as boss over
"ten to twelve partners, all associated by blood or by marriage").
173 Id. at 432 (describing permission that was required from mob boss who held
supervisory role).
174 id.
175 See Rovane, supra note 135, at 193 (providing Donnie Brasco as an example).
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relevant information may enforce the information-pooling requirement in a
decidedly draconian manner. 176
B. LOOSELY KNIT VERTICAL CONSPIRACIES
The second category is the loosely knit vertical conspiracy. This
conspiracy retains the top-down decision-making structure of the previous
conspiracy, but does so without a significant degree of pooled information.
Coordination is therefore minimal. Individual members of the conspiracy
each pursue activity that furthers the criminal purposes of the group, 177 but
they do so independently and with little coordination. They do not report
back every hour or every day with information that is then assimilated into
the decision-making process of the conspiracy. Rather, they simply go out
and perform whatever criminal activity the organization was constituted
for. 178

The best example of a loosely knit vertical conspiracy is a case of
crimes against humanity that are committed by individual soldiers with
limited contact with the architects and organizers of the plan. Imagine an
army or militia that conducts mass atrocities against a civilian population
that it hopes to terrorize. 179 The army leadership decides that it is going to
forego the usual laws of war and will resort to intentional civilian killings,
as well as looting, rape, and murder. 180 The Army makes this decision at
the highest echelons, because it believes that foregoing the usual constraints
on lawful warfare will help it achieve military victory by instilling fear in

176 See Associated Press, FBI Indicts 14 Reputed Mob Figures, USA TODAY, Apr. 25,

2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-04-25-fbi-mob-x.htm
(discussing prosecution by U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald of Chicago Mob figures,
including police officers who revealed names of Mob figures who were helping federal
investigators).
177 Such cases are prosecuted under the joint criminal enterprise doctrine. See Rome
Statute, supra note 98, at art. 25(3)(d) (identifying the "aim of furthering the criminal
activity or criminal purpose of the group"); Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY
Appeals Chamber Judgment, 7 203 (July 15, 1999); CASSESE, supra note 97, at 186-76
(analyzing concentration camp cases).
178 Id.

179 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, ICTY Trial Chamber
Judgment, 308 (Sept. 27, 2006) (describing plan by Serb forces to kill one Muslim family
on each side of town to instill fear in the local population); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No.
IT-98-33-T, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment, % 41-43 (Aug. 2, 2001) (describing acts
designed to instill fear among Muslim refugees).
"8' See Krajilnik, 309 (describing killings, looting, and rapes conducted by Arkan's
paramilitary forces); Krstic, 7 44 (reporting a mother whose children were taken away in the
night and killed during campaign of fear).
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the local population, or will advance genocidal goals. 181 However,
individual soldiers may commit these atrocities in faraway villages and will
not necessarily report their activities to the commanders who are making
these decisions. 182 In fact, the soldiers may belong to militias that stand
outside of the chain of command. 183 Yet, in some sense, it would be
inaccurate to refer to these soldiers as simple individuals committing
isolated acts of criminal behavior. 8 4 They clearly know that their actions
fit in with a larger criminal endeavor.'85 But they are not a part of a tightly
knit conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. 6
Rather, they are one part of a loosely knit vertical conspiracy to commit
those crimes. The decisions are made by the military authorities, but the
crimes are often executed by individual members of the conspiracy who

181See Krajignik,

305-09 (describing campaign to rid municipality of Muslims);

Krstic, 85 (describing plan to execute all Muslim civilian males of military age). However,
in many cases campaigns of extermination were broader than their original intent and
included young teenage boys and elderly men. See Krstic, 85.
182 For example, militias in Darfur were found to be operating with support and financing
from state officials, though in some cases without direct oversight of their daily activities.
Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, at 33-34 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/darfurreport.doc.
183 Much of the military atrocities in Serbia, Rwanda, and Darfur were committed by
militias that stood outside of the "regular" military chain of command, though their activities
were frequently directed or coordinated by superiors through other channels, either directly
or indirectly. See, e.g., Krajignik, 309 (describing Arkan's forces in Serbia); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment,
12A (Sept. 2, 1998) (describing rapes,
beatings, and killings by local militias); Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 182,
at 31-32 (Jan. 25, 2005) (noting that Janjaweed militias in Darfur were acting with the
"support, complicity or tolerance of the Sudanese State authorities"). Militia forces were
also used during Indonesia's campaign of violence in East Timor. See Carsten Stahn,
Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Reconciliation: The UN
Truth Commissionfor East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 952, 952-53 (2001) (reporting the proIndonesian militias prior to 1999 referendum on independence).
184 The ICTY has steadfastly insisted on viewing these activities within their collective
context by analyzing them under the doctrine of joint criminal enterprises. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment,
59 (Mar. 22, 2002)
(reaffirming joint criminal enterprise doctrine and rejecting Trial Chamber's application of
co-perpetrator model). For a discussion, see Ohlin, supra note 94. The doctrine was first
enunciated in Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Judgment, 186 (July 15,
1999).
185 See, e.g., Tadih,
232 (noting that "[aippellant was aware that the actions of the
group of which he was a member were likely to lead to such killings").
186 For criticism of applications of the conspiracy doctrine in these cases, see Jens David
Ohlin, Three ConceptualProblems with the Doctrine of Joint CriminalEnterprise,5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 69, 85-88 (2007).
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sometimes have little to no coordination of their actions. 187 Although the
individual soldiers are aware of the commandments from above, they do not
pool information with their superiors in such a way that the conspiracy is
intimately involved
in their actions. They simply receive orders and then
88
follow them. 1
C.TIGHTLY KNIT HORIZONTAL CONSPIRACIES
The third kind of conspiracy is the tightly knit horizontalconspiracy.
These conspiracies are identifiable by shared decision-making and pooled
information. Therefore, in addition to the fact that decisions are made
across a horizontal group of conspirators, information is also pooled among
all members of the conspiracy. The classic example of such a conspiracy
would be a bank robbery. 89 These crimes are frequently collective because
it is much easier to rob a bank in a group rather than go it alone. 90 Bank
robberies are complex criminal escapades that require multiple participants,
including a lookout, getaway driver, and stick-up man. However, bank
robberies are always committed by small, integrated groups, not the kind of
large groups that dominate the mafia or, say, an army committing war
crimes.
The element of the tightly knit horizontal conspiracy that ought to be
emphasized is the degree to which such criminal groups-figurativelybreathe together. When the conspiracy only includes, say, three or four
members, there is a greater likelihood that decisions are made collectively
at the horizontal level. Larger organizations necessarily require some kind
187

There are vast differences in the level of coordination depending on the atrocity in

question. In the case of Nazi Germany, it was clear that the genocide was not only planned
and directed by the highest echelons of Hitler's government, but the execution of the plan
was also carried out by regular German forces whose actions were coordinated by the
military chain of command. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TR!ALs (1992) (detailing role of German military organizations in Nazi
atrocities). In contrast, the Darfur genocide appears to be conducted by militias that receive
state support for their activities, although their daily conduct is not always directed by state
officials. See Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 182, at 34-35 (Jan. 25, 2005)
(describing gifts and cash payments from Sudanese government officials to militias).
188 None of this is meant to suggest that all conspiracies to commit war crimes and
genocide follow this pattern. Indeed, many do not. It is quite possible to have a vertical
conspiracy that is so closely knit, with extensive coordination, that it resembles a mafia
family. The Nazi system of genocide may be one example, where all information relevant to
the "Final Solution" was expected to be pushed up the chain of command. In some cases in
the former Yugoslavia the conspiracies functioned in this way, especially when the atrocities
were committed by regular forces as opposed to paramilitary forces.
189 See, e.g., United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007) (Pinkerton
liability in bank robbery case).
190 Id. (describing complex plans required for bank robbery).
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of vertical top-down decision-making in order to stave off chaos and
disorder; smaller criminal endeavors have the luxury of debating a course of
action amongst all conspirators and then deciding collectively to pursue that
course of action. All members of this kind of conspiracy have equal access
to all sources of information and reason is collectivized at the group level.
This dissection of the various kinds of conspiracies leaves out a fourth
possibility that is unlikely to occur: the loosely knit horizontal conspiracy,
evidenced by shared decision-making without pooled information. Such a
conspiracy is highly unlikely, since shared decision-making implies at least
a minimal amount of pooled information. How can decisions be made
together if information is not also shared? Of course, one might imagine a
scenario where the conspiracy adopts a shared decision-making structure,
but some member of the conspiracy is a holdout and keeps some
information to himself. However, so long as the conspiracy is ostensibly
committed to the principle of information sharing, deviation from this norm
should be considered as a simple failure to live up to the demands of the
group's decision-making procedure. 191 If the individual is found out, the
group may demand the information or seek a reprisal against any member
who refuses to comply with the agreed-upon decision procedure. These
cases are better analyzed as tightly knit horizontal conspiracies, albeit with
defecting members.
D. APPLICATION
The three central categories of conspiracy are not mutually exclusive.
Some criminal groups may have combinations of each woven together in
complex patterns. A criminal endeavor may include, for example, a tightly
knit horizontal conspiracy among decision-makers, who are then somehow
related to a vertical conspiracy that extends down to the level of street
thugs. 192 Although these two conspiracies are related-i.e., pursuing the
same criminal goals-it is nonetheless important to keep them separate. In
such cases, there are two conspiracies that intersect; the vertical conspiracy
191 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
192

This is frequently the case in international criminal law. See Kai Ambos, Joint

Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 159, 180 (2007)
(discussing coordination along horizontal level); see also Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT97-24-A, Trial Judgment, 376 (July 31, 2003) (discussing vertical cooperation in joint
criminal enterprise case). Also, a horizontal conspiracy among military planners to commit
crimes against humanity and genocide may be connected to a vertical conspiracy that
extends down to the platoon level. This issue is discussed in Mark Osiel, The Banality of
Good. Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1769 (2005)
(discussing "vertical and lateral dimension to the social dynamics between those involved in
state-sponsored mass atrocity"). Indeed, Osiel correctly notes that instructions are usually
given from the top down and "information conveyed from bottom to top." Id. at 1769.
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maintains a distinct deliberative structure that is entirely different from the
horizontal conspiracy.
As a final point, the categories allow for differences in degree. At
what point will a closely knit conspiracy become loosely knit? These are
complex questions of fact. However, it would be hasty to conclude that this
difficult exercise in line-drawing makes these categories suspect. There
will always be difficult fact patterns that might be hard to classify as either
tightly knit or loosely knit. But these difficult questions of application do
not undermine the essential usefulness of the categories in the vast majority
of cases where it is easy to determine if a conspiracy uses shared decisionmaking and pools information.
The task is now to evaluate the three kinds of conspiracy against the
overlapping agents model in order to determine which-if anydemonstrate the kind of rational deliberative structure of an overlapping
agent sufficient to generate the kind of group intentions necessary to ground
Pinkerton liability. The reader will recall that our model described
collective endeavors as composed of overlapping agents who agree to
collectivize reason at the global level and employ premise-centered
reasoning. 193 The collectivized reason of an overlapping agent allows the
group to stand in a certain rational posture with other agents, i.e., to engage
in reason-giving and reason-demanding behavior. 194 In other words, the
overlapping agent is capable of having its own reasons, articulating them,
holding others responsible for their reasons, and in turn capable of being
held responsible for its own reasons. This allows it to have a collective
intention in the relevant sense for Pinkerton.
Against this standard, the three kinds of conspiracies stand in marked
contrast. The loosely knit vertical conspiracy hardly demonstrates any of
the qualities of collectivized reason, because the far-flung participants may
not even be aware of the premises of the conspiracy, nor do they engage in
any kind of collective deliberation. The tightly knit vertical conspiracy
demonstrates some of the qualities of collectivized reason, insofar as all
members of the conspiracy have access to the same information, but the
degree of collective deliberation is minor or non-existent. If the decisions
are all being made at the top, there is no need to engage in collective
deliberation with those at the bottom. 195 Contradictions will not be
resolved, nor will they even be discussed. 196 Only the tightly knit
horizontal conspiracy demonstrates the kind of integration necessary for
193 See supra Part IV.
194 See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (discussing Bennett, Pettit, and Parfit
on rationality).
195 See Osiel, supra note 192, at 1769.
196 Id.
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collective reasoning and, as such, demonstrates the kind of overlapping
agent that is capable of forming a collective intention. This is the best way
to explain how Daniel Pinkerton could be liable for Walter's actions, even
though he was in jail at the time. Daniel's culpability stems from the
wrongful acts of a group conspiracy composed from the overlap of Daniel
and Walter, both of whom can now be viewed in their capacity as group
members, not individuals. Having stood together in pursuit of criminal
objectives, they must now stand together to face criminal justice.
Of course, there may be a middle ground between tightly knit vertical
and horizontal conspiracies, depending on the degree to which decisionmaking is shared; the difference is a continuum, not absolute. But this does
not weaken the conclusion. Rather, it reinforces our previous statement that
some criminal groups may demonstrate a hodge-podge of different
flavors. 19 7 However, it is certain that a conspiracy without any substantial
degree of rational integration or shared decision-making is incapable of
producing a collective intention sufficient for Pinkerton liability.

VII. REFORMING PNKERTON LIABILITY
Having identified the different kinds of conspiracies and measured
them against our model for understanding collective action, we can now
better explicate how the Pinkerton doctrine must be reformed to take into
account the internal deliberative structure of conspiracies. In essence, the
reforms are required by our overlapping agents model, which demonstrates
that conspiracies are neither atomic nor inscrutable, nor are they cut from
the same cloth. It matters how the individual agents within a conspiracy go
about reaching a collective decision, because this determines whether a
collective intention can be attributed to an individual or not.
A. RETHINKING PINKERTON LIABILITY
1. Limiting Vicarious Liability to Tightly Knit Conspiracies
It should be clear now that vicarious liability, even for acts that fall
within the scope of the criminal agreement, should be reserved for tightly
knit conspiracies with shared decision-making. These overlapping agents
are sufficiently cohesive to produce collective intentions, but conspirators
in a loosely knit conspiracy, with far-flung participants, should not be
vicariously liable for the actions of co-conspirators. 98 These conspiracies
are so loosely organized that each member's role in the deliberative

197See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
198This is precisely the kind of liability generated by the Pinkerton doctrine.
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structure is not sufficiently fixed to produce a collective intention. The
overlap is not sufficiently significant to ground an attribution of liability
consistent with the culpability principle.1 99
Vicarious liability makes sense in the case of a tightly knit horizontal
conspiracy because the agent in question closely participates in the
deliberative structure of the agent and helps form the collective intention. It
is this fact that generates culpability, for the simple reason that he
participated closely in the decision-making process and, in a sense, made it
his own. However, agents in a loosely knit conspiracy have no such role in
the deliberative structure of the overlapping agent; such loosely organized
endeavors arguably have no collective intentions at all because reason is not
collectivized.
2. Eliminatingthe ForeseeableConsequences Doctrine
Recall our previous statement that Pinkerton involves two
applications: (1) vicarious liability for actions within the scope of the
criminal agreement, and (2) vicarious liability for actions that extend
beyond the criminal agreement and are a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the conspiracy. Based on the previous analysis, it is now
abundantly clear why vicarious liability in the first version is defensible.
Individuals who join conspiracies engage in collective decision-making that
results in a collective intention. This intention, and the wrongful act it
produces, can then be attributed to all members participating in the
decision-making process.
However, the second, more extensive application of Pinkerton cannot
be justified, given that the mental intention of the group must be attributed
to the defendant in order to ground the vicarious liability. 200 But where the
action extends beyond the criminal agreement, how can it be said that the
group has a collective intention to commit the crime? The group clearly
does not, for the very reason that the group did not agree to the act in
question, but rather formed an agreement for a narrower initiative that one
individual decided to breach. Furthermore, it is unclear how limiting

199

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.

Federal courts have been so willing to apply the foreseeable consequences doctrine
that some consequences are almost per se foreseeable, given the frequency with which
prosecutors have successfully resorted to this theory of liability. The classic example is that
it is foreseeable that a co-conspirator who owns a weapon might use it to commit a violent
felony. See, e.g., United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2006). This reasoning
even applies when the defendant is unaware that his co-conspirator brought the weapon to
the locus of the criminal act. See United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 1994)
("A co-conspirator can be held vicariously liable under Pinkerton despite his claims that he
did not know or suspect the gun's presence in the car.").
200
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Pinkerton liability to acts that are reasonably foreseeable provides any
answer to the problem. 20 1 One still has to find the mens rea somewhere,
and limiting application to foreseeable cases does not help in attributing the
required mental element to a conspirator.
In order to understand the rationale of these two reforms, we return to
the culpability principle and apply it to the decision-making structure of
conspiracies discussed in Parts V and VI. A reformed Pinkerton doctrine,
limited to tightly knit horizontal conspiracies and to acts that fall within the
scope of the criminal plan, would remain more faithful to the culpability
principle and the underlying rationales of criminal justice.2 °2 These factual
determinations could be made at trial, and established criteria could be
applied using the overlapping agents model.20 3 An agent from a loosely
knit conspiracy is far removed from the rational process of reason-asking

201

The impact of the foreseeability requirement is supposedly reduced by restricting its

application to conduct that is "reasonably" foreseeable, though prosecutors and judges have
responded by finding increasingly creative arguments to demonstrate that a particular
outcome was reasonably foreseeable. For a discussion of this problem, see Jens David Ohlin
& George P. Fletcher, Reclaiming Fundamental Principlesof Law in the DarfurCase, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 539, 549 (2005).
202 It should be emphasized that the doctrinal amendment proposed here is limited to
Pinkerton liability and does not implicate conspiracy as a stand-alone offense, prosecuted
before a criminal plan comes to fruition. I am not questioning the idea that conspiracy per se
should be criminal (as a stand-alone offense). The stand-alone offense provides an incentive
for individuals to refrain from collective criminal endeavors, and if they join one, they
remain liable for the substantive crime of conspiracy. In fact, this may very well give them
an incentive to cooperate. Also, such prosecutions may be consistent with the culpability
principle, provided that conspiracy to commit a particular crime is considered as a lesser
offense than the particular crime itself.
203 Of course, it is difficult to predict the practical effect of eliminating the foreseeable
consequences doctrine. Instead of relying on the foreseeable consequences doctrine,
prosecutors might simply prosecute the same conduct by arguing instead that the actions
formed part of the group's criminal agreement, as evidenced by either an implicit
arrangement or explicit discussion. This fact highlights the degree to which the foreseeable
consequences doctrine, in reality, represented a burden-lifting provision for prosecutors.
Instead of requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the scope of the
conspiracy included the criminal conduct at issue, prosecutors could simply avoid that
question as moot under the foreseeable consequences doctrine, and instead approach the
matter as an issue of law. Therefore, eliminating the foreseeable consequences doctrine
would certainly have the following practical effect: it would remove the doctrine as a crutch
for prosecutors and force them to deal more directly with the factual issue of the
conspiracy's true scope. This is the correct result, for the true scope of the criminal
conspiracy ought to be the sine qua non of any Pinkerton prosecution.
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and reason-giving behaviors z°4 and these offenders
should be prosecuted
2 05

under the standard rules for accomplice liability.

Why should this be morally or legally relevant? Simply put, unless
one advances a purely consequentialist justification for Pinkerton's broad
attribution of vicarious liability, one has to tell some story that purports to
connect the actions of a defendant with the actions of his co-conspirators,
consistent with a general theory of responsibility. The source of this
demand is the culpability principle, which limits punishment to each
individual's degree of culpability. In the absence of straight utilitarian
calculations, a desert-based argument must refer, in some way, to the
conspiratorial agreement that both individuals share.2 °6 I have argued above
that the only viable solution is an appeal to a collective intention, so that the
intention of the group becomes, for purposes of criminal justice, the
intention of the defendant. 20 7 In previous sections, I defended the claim that
the hallmark of true collective agency, sufficient for the creation of a
collective intention, is collectivized reason and premise-centered reasoning.
No other non-consequentialist account could provide the necessary
foundation for such a broad attribution of vicarious liability. By this
standard, then, a collective intention cannot be attributed to lower-rung
members of a loosely knit vertical conspiracy because they do not
participate in the collective reasoning.
In making these distinctions, we need to understand the difference
between collecting and disseminating information, and deliberating towards
a desired outcome while selecting a course of action to achieve it. The
latter may produce a collective intention because it suggests a closer
association with the deliberative process of the common criminal endeavor,
sufficient to generate responsibility through the existence of a collective
intention. For the more loosely organized conspiracies, vicarious liability

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (2001) (accomplice liability for aiding and
abetting). But see FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 650-51 (noting that under Anglo-American
and French law, accessories and perpetrators are treated the same).
206 On the difficulties on giving up desert within the confines of criminal law theory, see
supra note 49-50 and accompanying text. Compare JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal
204

205

Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55-60 (1970)

(defining desert as moral notion upon which responsive attitudes and institutions of
punishment are founded), with Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 456 (1997) (arguing for a "just desert allocation of liability ... based
upon the community's shared principles of justice rather than on those developed by moral
philosophers").
207 See supra Part III.
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must be rejected in favor of the traditional principles of accomplice liability
preferred by the Model Penal Code.2 °8
B. RETHINKING EQUAL CULPABILITY
These observations suggest a second category of doctrinal
amendments. Traditional Pinkerton rules entail that all members of the
conspiracy are equally liable, regardless of their level of participation
(provided that they meet the threshold requirement of a substantial
contribution). 20 9 This result is entailed by the underlying principles of
Pinkerton liability. If each conspirator is liable for the substantive crimes
of its members, it would stand to reason that each is equally culpable, for in
the eyes of the law each member has-by definition-committed the same
crimes. It is worth dwelling on this unique consequence of Pinkerton and
whether our previous categorizations suggest a change of course.210
Our analysis in the previous section suggested that shared decisionmaking should be treated differently from mere participation in the form of
pooled information. If the doctrine of equal culpability makes sense at all,
it makes sense when there is shared decision-making. In this case, the
collective intention of the group justifies the attribution of vicarious
liability. One can therefore make a plausible argument that the common
deliberations allow us to attribute the collective decisions to all members
equally, since all members participated in the decision-making process.
However, if there is no shared decision-making, equal culpability must be
generated (and justified) by some other mysterious factor. Indeed, it seems
intuitively correct that decision-makers are more culpable than mere
contributors, and that equal culpability for all conspirators should be limited
to conspiracy cases where all participants are involved in the rational
decision-making process, i.e., the tightly knit horizontal conspiracy. 2' In
such cases, the fact that multiple agents use collective reasoning means that
each, in a way, shares the criminal reasons that generate not just criminal
liability, but equal criminal liability.

208 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06.
209

See United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940) (finding the mere selling of sugar

to distillers insufficient for conspiracy liability).
210 See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) ("Enmund did not kill or
intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed;
yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed
the Kerseys. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.").
211 Each member of such a conspiracy makes a significant contribution that would
qualify under complicity standards-each engages in an overt act in support of the criminal
objective.
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But what if we justify the doctrine of equal culpability on efficiency
Arguably, the imposition of equal culpability provides an
grounds?
incentive against collective criminal behavior, since participants will be
unlikely to join a conspiracy if they automatically "inherit" full culpability
of their co-conspirators in more advanced positions in the hierarchy.2 12 On
this theory, then, equal culpability is justified not only in cases of tightly
knit horizontal conspiracies (as I have suggested), but all flavors of
conspiracy. However, the consequentialist argument cuts both ways. The
equal culpability scheme provides a perverse incentive for minor
participants to engage in greater degrees of criminality because they already
share culpability with their criminal compatriots who exercise greater
control. Once part of a conspiracy, the law apparently makes no distinction
between participants-a disavowal harmful even by consequentialist lights.
The law ought to give incentives for minor participants to remain that way,
such that those who take on the greatest responsibilities also take on the
greatest risks of liability. Such centrifugal forces would pull conspiracies
apart rather than provide an incentive to pull them closer together. In the
end, it would help prevent collective criminal endeavors from achieving the
very kind of close cooperation at issue in this Article (in a closely knit
conspiracy) that generates the most destructive criminal behavior.
C. OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY
1. The Common Action Requirement
Some courts have found that a conspiracy can be created even in the
absence of an agreement to commit simultaneous actions. Interstate Circuit
v. United States213 is one famous example. In Interstate, movie theaters
were charged with conspiracy under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and the
Court held that "[i]t is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and
often is formed without simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the
conspirators., 21 4 The Court's argument suggests that parallel actions, even
in the absence of an explicit agreement, might be considered a conspiracy
since each member knew that "success" was only possible if each
participated in the activity. Although there was no explicit coordination,

212See, e.g., United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining

that members of a conspiracy may be charged with conspiracy for actions committed by coconspirators prior to their date of joining, although they do not inherit retroactive liability for
substantive offenses).
213 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
214 Id.
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the parallel actions functioned like a conspiracy because each "conspirator"
knew what the outcome would be if each acted in a certain way.
It should be clear from our analysis that such a loose definition of
conspiracy would be insufficient to ground vicarious liability. The required
mental element can only be found in group intentions, and in a conspiracy
like Interstate there is no group intention at all. What would it mean to say
that the movie theater chains in Interstate intended to restrict competition
and fix prices? Group intentions arise during common deliberation and
common action, but mere parallel actions do not implicate shared decisionmaking or collective reason. In such cases, individuals do not submit their
reasons to the group, but rather keep their reasons to themselves and make
similar calculations that result in parallel actions.
Consequently,
vicariously liability must be limited to conspiracies with common actions
that rise beyond parallel actions.
2. Liabilityfor PriorActs of the Conspiracy
Another doctrinal puzzle involves imposition of vicarious liability for
the acts of the conspiracy prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy.
Does the defendant "inherit" the crimes of the group through the mere act
of joining the conspiracy? This issue can be divided into two situations.
First, does the defendant inherit liability for the prior acts of the conspiracy
that fall within the scope of the criminal agreement that he has now formed?
Second, does the defendant inherit liability for the prior acts of members
that may fall outside the scope of the criminal agreement, though they
might be reasonably foreseeable if, of course, they were to happen in the
future? An interesting argument might be marshaled in favor of the latter
position by noting that it should not matter whether the reasonably
foreseeable actions actually happen in the past or the future; what matters is
whether they would be reasonable foreseeable if they were to happen in the
future.
Of course, Pinkerton liability was never meant to be applied in this
manner, and even federal courts have generally refused to apply it
retroactively, though it is unclear if courts refuse to apply it retroactively for
the right reasons.215 First, it is clear that individuals who join a conspiracy
should not be vicariously liable for the prior actions of wayward
conspirators, since we have already argued that such liability is never
justified. However, they also should not be held liable for the prior acts of
fellow conspirators that are within the scope of the conspiratorial plan. The
relevant question is whether the group intention to commit the crime can be
attributed to the defendant who joins the conspiracy. At the time that the
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group intention was formed, however, the individual was not part of the
conspiracy. Therefore, the imposition of liability would require us to
attribute to the defendant a collective intention that he played no part in
formulating, since it arose before he joined the conspiracy. And this would
be no more justifiable than attributing to him someone else's intention.
3. Multiple Objectives
Another doctrinal puzzle involves drawing the boundary lines around a
conspiracy. Criminal plans rarely involve a single criminal act; they are
composed of multiple subparts, each of which may be prosecuted as another
criminal offense. This raises the question of how to define the contours of
the conspiracy. For example, a mafia family may pursue multiple criminal
objectives at the same time. Is this a single conspiracy or a group of
distinct but related conspiracies? Answering this question has profound
implications for vicarious liability, since defendants face vicarious liability
for the actions of co-conspirators, but obviously not for the actions of
criminals belonging to a different conspiracy. Failure to have a coherent
theory for defining the outer contours of a conspiracy might make an
individual liable for the actions of dozens of criminals to whom they have
little relationship. For example, in Kotteakos v. UnitedStates, the Supreme
Court noted that "separate adventures of like character" could not be
melded together into the common purpose of a single enterprise.2 1 6 In that
case, there were eight separate conspiracies, though each had a common
member and each violated the National Housing Act. But these facts alone
were insufficient to prove a single global conspiracy.
It is now clear why melding together "separate adventures of like
character" is impermissible, at least for purposes of vicarious liability. The
relevant question is finding the individuals with whom the defendant
collectivized reason by forming a horizontal conspiracy committed to some
criminal goal. It is this group that has the collective criminal intention
necessary for grounding vicarious liability. A far-flung collection of
multiple conspiracies has no collective intention; at least, not if there is no
collective deliberation among the groups.
4. Abandonment
Classic conspiracy doctrine places severe restrictions on the
circumstances under which a defendant can withdraw from a conspiracy.2 17
Such a withdrawal does not vitiate liability for the actions of the conspiracy
216 328 U.S. 750, 769 (1946).
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prior to withdrawal, but does, if successful, stop liability for any future acts
committed by the conspiracy after the departure of the defendant.
Jurisdictions are generally split on this issue, with some (including the
federal courts) requiring a simple announcement of abandonment to one's
fellow conspirators, while others demand that the withdrawing member
actually "thwart" the criminal plan if he hopes to end his vicarious liability
for the conspiracy's future actions.21 8
The harsh thwarting requirement does not appear to be justified. In a
sense, the thwarting requirement is akin to disallowing withdrawal.
Individuals retain vicarious liability unless they thwart the conspiracy. But
if they successfully thwart the conspiracy, then they would not be subject to
vicarious liability anyway, since there would be no completed criminal
offense to be liable for. This doctrinal scheme is inconsistent with our
understanding of how collective intentions are attributed to a conspirator.
Once a conspirator departs from the conspiracy, he stops engaging in the
process of collectivized reason-the very factor that we have identified as
most significant for the formation of collective intentions. If this is true,
their departure from the collective reasoning process removes the very
factor that justified their vicarious liability in the first place, i.e., their
participation in the formation of the collective intention. With the
withdrawal in place, liability should end, as well, simply by virtue of their
219
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219 Could the strict thwarting requirement be justified on consequentialist grounds?
Obviously it would provide incentives against joining criminal conspiracies in the first place,
given that the standards for withdrawal are so high. Criminals considering joining a
conspiracy would think twice about it, as long as they have the foresight to realize that they
might, in the future, disagree with the criminal aims of the conspiracy and desire a
withdrawal that may be more difficult to achieve than they first thought. However, this
incentive structure proves problematic, even on consequentialist grounds, because it provides
a perverse incentive for conspirators to stick with the criminal objective. Given the fact that
thwarting a criminal endeavor is so difficult (and potentially dangerous, depending on the
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VIII. CONCLUSION

Although collective criminal behavior is no doubt destructive for
society, this alone cannot serve as an adequate justification for Pinkerton.
The demands of criminal law theory cannot be brushed aside. Only the
collective reason exhibited by a truly integrated and tightly knit conspiracy
can serve as an appropriate route for meeting the act and intention
requirements for vicarious criminal liability. Nonetheless, by appealing to
the collective reason exhibited by the tightly knit conspiracy and, in so
doing, unlocking the theoretical foundation for Pinkerton, we have also
pulled back the worst excesses of Pinkerton to remain consistent with basic
principles of criminal law. The criminal justice system can no longer
tolerate vicarious liability for the foreseeable consequences of coconspirators-a frequent refrain but one that previously could not be
explained. The collective intention of the group to commit the crime
provides the necessary mental element to sustain vicarious liability, but
when participants engage in actions that fall outside the scope of the
criminal plan, by definition no such collective intention exists. The
elements of this theory-overlapping agents and collective intentions-are
new to criminal law theory, but they emerge from basic notions that are not
at all foreign to the criminal law literature. Indeed, they are the product of a
sober analysis of the deliberative structure of conspiracies, appealing to
decision theory, and they avoid all vestiges of overbearing nineteenth
century doctrines of corporate wills. The doctrinal amendments proposed
in this Article-limiting Pinkerton to tightly knit conspiracies, eliminating
the foreseeable consequences doctrine, etc.-are mandated by nothing more
extravagant than the manner and mode of decision-making in conspiracies,
which is precisely the appropriate subject for the criminal law.

criminal gang), conspirators may choose to stay in the conspiracy, rather than leave and
remain saddled with vicarious liability for a co-conspirator's actions. Better to stay and gain
the benefits of the conspiracy, rather than leave and keep only the legal burdens.

